Growth Matters More:
A Review of the Place of Informal Eldercare in Development Theory and Practice

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INTRODUCTION

For a long time, the very concept of development, as a discipline and practice, has been grounded in economic theories and perspectives (cf. Escobar 1995). However, especially since the 1970s, scholars and practitioners alike have significantly challenged the dominance of the economic development paradigm and the extent to which economic growth is able to have ‘trickle-down’ effects. As of the 1990s and the advent of the ‘Human Development’ approach, the issue of equity, inclusion and participation by development subjects in the formulation of programs, and the shift from needs-based to rights-based approaches, suggests that there is indeed a fundamental shift from the hegemonic hold that economic development has had in both theory and practice. That is, the shift in focus towards alternative development approaches is assumed to have resolved, at least in part, some of the inequities that were omitted from consideration in the economic (growth) approach.

However, alongside this broad shift in foci and approach, the on-going saliency of economic development as structuring the nature of the relationship between developed and developing societies, multilateral and bilateral ‘partners’ and donor recipient countries, and further states and their citizens, remains uninterrupted. Human development approaches have been incorporated alongside, rather than as an alternative to the growth approach (see for example, Sachs 2005; Sen 1999). To this end, there continues to be a vast volume of scholarship and practice concerned with economic development that is especially directed towards societies and contexts lacking in it. Yet, it is apparent that societies, which have already achieved a relatively significant level of economic growth, are also experiencing not only on-going, but also new forms of disparity, inequity and marginalisation. This observation counters the original economic growth assumption that wealth ‘trickles-down’.

Coupled with the observation that fertility rates fall as societies develop economically, many developing and newly developed countries are facing the problem of an ageing population as well as socioeconomic inequities (World Bank 1994). Some scholars have observed that there is a growing gap between the elderly and other segments of society – for one, the elderly are increasingly situated among the most financially vulnerable segments of the population (see for example Lee 1998). The place of the elderly in development thus presents a critical area for study.

This paper seeks to understand how the socioeconomic status of the elderly changes as a society develops economically, by reviewing of the place of informal eldercare in development theory and practice. Informal eldercare refers to any form of care provided by familial and/or informal sources, including material and financial support. I argue that the elderly are marginalised to the extent that informal eldercare is subordinated to the relentless pursuit of economic development. As far as the elderly and their demand for care are concerned, economic growth matters more in both theory and practice.

Firstly, I review the application of modernisation and dependency theories to the study of the elderly. I urge that these dominant theoretical frameworks, which are applied to studying the socioeconomic status of the elderly, are centred on a strong economic development paradigm from within which, the weaker socioeconomic status of the elderly is seen a product, if not a victim, of development.
Secondly, I review the political economy of eldercare in Southeast and East Asia, with a particular emphasis on Singapore. I urge that development practice at the state-level is likewise centered on a strong economic development paradigm – namely, that the promotion of informal familial eldercare is fundamentally driven by the unwavering pursuit of economic growth and prosperity.

Thirdly, I explore how the responsibility of elderly care is negotiated within Singaporean families, especially as it relates to gender and the employment of foreign domestic workers. I argue that even at the family-level, the underlying motivation for transferring the burden of care to foreign women is again growth. Thus in both development theory and practice, there continues to be a strong focus on economic growth; and growth matters more as far as the elderly and their demand for informal care is concerned. Finally, I conclude with some directions for further research.

THE PERSISTANCE OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM IN THEORY

The two dominant theoretical frames within which the majority of studies of the elderly are situated are: modernisation theory and dependency theory (see Aboderin 2004; Cowgill & Holmes 1972; Neysmith & Edwardh 1984; Palmore & Manton 1974). Early elaborations of modernisation theory began in the 1960s with Burgess as an attempt to describe the situation of older persons in the West and to explain the observed decline in material family support and the increasing need for social welfare (Aboderin 2004). The theory was later developed more ‘systematically’ by Cowgill (Marshall 1996: 15).

Modernisation and the ‘Unwillingness’ to Provide Informal Care?

In a cross-sectional examination of 15 societies at different stages of modernisation, Cowgill (1972) hypothesised that the status of the elderly declined with the progress of modernisation. He assumed a linear progression – that current developing societies will follow a similar trajectory of modernisation and decline in elder status as that experienced by Western societies. Since then, numerous studies drawing upon historical evidence, ethnographic and demographic data have questioned the assumption of linearity between elder status and modernisation (see for example, Albert & Cattell 1994; Palmore & Manton 1974). Despite criticisms, modernisation theory continues to be a dominant theoretical frame and was indeed legitimised by the United Nations in the early 1980s, when it was adopted as the central framework for policy development and recommendations in the ‘Report of the World Assembly on Aging, Vienna 26 July to 6 August 1982’.

Those who emphasise the modernisation process generally focus on the changing shape of the family within a modern industrialised society. The breakdown of the extended family and the rise of the nuclear family are presumed to be products of modernisation that have marginalised the elderly in terms of declining material family support and reduced socioeconomic status. However, when one considers studies that are more concerned with policy consequences, as opposed to theoretical implications, one finds evidence that the socioeconomic status of the elderly may not be declining in all post-industrial societies (for examples of such studies, see Chan 2005; Doty 1986).

In a 1986 study on American families, institutional care and the role of public policy, Doty found little evidence to support the notion that American families were now less-willing to care for elderly family members at home. Instead, she contends that informal familial care remains at a high level, driven by the primary motivation of a sense of family responsibility. Similarly, but in a more recent study on Southeast and East Asian societies, Chan (2005: 281) found that evidence that familial support for the elderly ‘may not be deteriorating as predicted by modernisation theory’. Chan’s argument is drawn from analysis of available longitudinal data on living arrangements, which she
finds has exhibited little change over time. One limitation of this study, however, is that it does not take into account values, attitudes and other indicators of older persons’ well-being – a point partly conceded by Chan herself when she notes that:

at present, we still know very little about changes in older adults’ well-being over time. Data collection that focuses on gathering longitudinal information will greatly increase our knowledge regarding the aging process in Asia. (Chan 2005: 282)

Dependency and the ‘Incapacity’ to Provide Informal Care?

While there may be general agreement among some scholars of the criticisms against modernisation theory as applied to the case of the elderly, there is ‘less consensus’ over what to replace modernisation theory with (Cherlin 1983: 62). One prominent alternative theory that arose in the 1980s is dependency theory (Neysmith & Edwardh 1984). The theory was developed by Third World scholars to explain the relationship between the developing and the industrial world but it has since been also applied to the study of the socioeconomic status of the elderly in developing countries. The theory explains the decline in old-age support in terms of the material and financial constraints experienced by the younger generation. It is therefore also referred to as the ‘material constraints’ explanation by Aboderin (2004).

Neysmith and Edwardh (1984) highlight that one feature of a modern economy, which reinforces the dependent position of Third World elderly is: retirement. In retirement, one ceases from being economically productive and the flow of income from employment ceases. One becomes dependent on savings and other social mechanisms of support, such as pensions, welfare and family. This emphasis on individual production was also made by Phillipson (1982: 166): ‘[o]ld age is seen as a “problem”, with the elderly viewed as dependants; worse still, they are often described as a non-productive burden upon the economy’. Such perception generates inequalities in the status between the generations, with the elderly viewed as consuming resources but not economically productive, and the young viewed as future producers even though they may be currently dependent.

The Centrality of the Economic Development Paradigm in Both Theories

Dependency theory is often presented alongside modernisation theory as a second explanation for the decline in material family support for the elderly (Aboderin 2004). For example, Hashimoto and Kendig’s review of family support for elderly around the world noted that ‘lack of resources’ and ‘lack of motivation’ are among the two main causes of poor familial care (cited in Aboderin 2004: 35). Similarly, Foner (1993: 105) highlights that in addition to changes in cultural values, sentiments of affection and promises of inheritance, ‘pressures of limited resources’ are also very important in explaining the decline in material family support for the elderly.

Scholars who draw on modernisation theory explain the decline in material family support for the elderly in terms of changing values and motivation. Their focus is on developed societies and on the degree of ‘willingness’ to provide. On the other hand, scholars who draw on dependency theory explain the decline as being due to material constraints, which are brought on by developing states having a weaker position in the global economy relative to more developed societies. Their focus is on developing societies and on the degree of ‘capacity’ to provide for the elderly. Both theories provide a frame within which to understand what happens to familial eldercare as a society develops economically. Thus, central to both theories is a strong economic development paradigm within which, the weaker socioeconomic status of the elderly is seen a product, if not a victim, of development.
THE PERSISTANCE OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM IN PRACTICE

As with development theories, the economic development paradigm is also central to and pervasive in development practice. The political economy of eldercare in many Southeast and East Asian states is fundamentally influenced by the ‘developmental’ pursuit of economic growth. As Razavi notes:

*[In East Asia the ‘developmental’ logic has been characterized by an ideology that subordinates welfare to economic development and industrialization, discourages dependence on the state, promotes private sources of welfare... and diverts the financial resources accumulated through social insurance programmes to investments in industry and infrastructure (Goodman and White, 1998; Kwon, 1998).] (Razavi 2007: 384)*

In effect, state promotion of familial eldercare is promoted as a cheaper alternative to welfare and therefore complementary to the pursuit of growth. Drawing on the literature and state policies of this region and in particular, Singapore, this section reviews the extent to which the elderly are marginalised as a result of the subordination of eldercare to growth.

**Passing the ‘Buck’ from State to Family**

As a developmental state, Singapore pursued fundamental development objectives in the direction of economic growth and prosperity led by one dominant political party (Ee 2011; Razavi 2007). Among the Southeast Asian countries today, Singapore clearly boasts the greatest affluence in terms of income indicators and the country continues to pursue growth relentlessly. The pursuit of growth is pervasive even to the way in which the issue of the ageing population is framed – firstly as an economic problem that has a potentially detrimental impact on future growth, then as a social problem (Ee 2011). It is understandable therefore that many studies of the elderly in Singapore explore the economic security and the social costs of an aging population (see for example Chan 2005; Chen & Jones 1989; Lee 1998, 2001; Phillips & Bartlett 1995).

Much of this discourse revolves around the debate between formal and informal modes of care, examining which is preferred and how to develop policies that encourage the preferred mode of care. In Singapore, as with most of Southeast and East Asia, there is a strong tendency to emphasise informal familial support. For example, Chan (2005) reveals that most of the elderly in this region receive very limited support from formal programmes. Instead, policies are instituted to encourage familial support. Similarly, an earlier study done by Martin (1988: S106), on aging trends and policies in Asia, also notes that ‘for the vast majority of Asians, pensions are not available’. But, unlike Martin, Chan (2005: 269) goes a step further to recommend the continuation of policies that ‘[enable] Asian families to provide this [familial] support’.

This strong emphasis on informal familial support in Asia stands in stark contrast to Europe’s welfare states. Walker (in Walker & Aspalter 2008: 15) notes that Europe is home to the ‘most advanced welfare states’, the cornerstone of which being the pension system, although it has since the mid-1970s showed signs of being economically unsustainable – a fact recognised by Walker and Aspalter (2008) as they attempt to contribute to the discussion on policy reforms. Such ‘European-style’ welfare policies that advocate formal material support for the aged are driven by the broad ideology that values ‘equity and social cohesion’, stressing that old-age care is within the purview of the state (Walker & Aspalter 2008: 58). In contrast, the majority of Southeast Asian policies are driven by the

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1 Singapore’s GNP per capita, was US$37,220 in 2009, highest among all Southeast Asian countries, followed by Malaysia, with GNP per capita of US$7,350 (Asian Development Bank 2011: 250).
broad ideology that old-age care is a private burden and the responsibility of the family. Further, Singapore exhibits a high tolerance for social inequality, which is accepted as a ‘by-product’ of economic development:

Singapore has elevated meritocracy to the level of a state religion with inequality being viewed essentially as a by-product of participation in the market system. Those who fail to seize the day are somehow lacking in the requisite degree of fervour. (Fong 1975: 82)

In addition to ideological differences and at a more practical level, many developing nations want to avoid the ‘tax burden of [Western-style] pensions’ and are developing alternative systems of old-age support, which stress the role of the family and valorises familial care as an ‘Asian value’ (Martin 1988: S109; Teo 2010a, 2010b; Zhan & Montgomery 2003). The term ‘Asian value’, however, is a misnomer as it glosses over the rich diversity of cultures in Asia. For example, Malaysia’s brand of ‘Asian values’ is based on Malay-Islamic culture, whereas in Singapore, as in East-Asia, ‘Asian values’ are intrinsically Confucian at heart (Sani 2008; Teo 2010b; Zhan & Montgomery 2003). References to the Confucian value of ‘filial piety’ are frequently found in everyday conversations and also in state rhetoric in Singapore (Ee 2011; Teo 2010b). For example, Teo (2010b: 350) finds that the notion that ‘care of the elderly has to fall on individual families’ is widely accepted by Singaporeans.

Promoting ‘Filial Piety’ as a Cheaper Alternative to State Welfare

Despite some evidence that formal and informal support are not always mutually exclusive – for example, Lund (2002) finds that the Old-age Pension in South Africa actually ‘crowds in’ private and familial care of the elderly by helping them to contribute financially to the family – still, policies in Asia are aimed at discouraging ‘dependence on the state’ and promoting ‘private sources of welfare’ (Chan 2005; Razavi 2007: 384). For example, in Singapore, tax incentives are given to children who contribute to parents’ retirement accounts (Chan 2005). However, this use of monetary incentives to crowd in familial support contradicts the official discourse on upholding the traditional value of ‘filial piety’ to the extent it suggests that the relentless pursuit of prosperity, which characterised the ‘developmental’ trajectory, still underpins state policies. It appears that in the discourse on promoting familial care for the elderly, ‘filial piety’ has repeatedly been used as a political and economic tool to justify minimal state provision of old-age support so that economic growth may not be hindered, rather than a sincere means of retaining traditions.

THE PERSISTANCE OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM IN FAMILY ARRANGEMENTS

At the family-level in Singapore, the responsibility for elderly care is largely negotiated in relation to gendered assumptions of care and the employment of foreign domestic workers. In this section, I argue that the underlying motivation for transferring the burden of eldercare to foreign women is, again, economic growth.

In a study on the relationship between the Singapore state and family, Teo (2010b) points out that ‘filial piety’ – the importance of caring for aged parents – is an ‘Asian value’ that has been strongly promoted by the Singapore state. In addition to tax incentives for contributing to parents’ retirement accounts, housing policies are also formulated to encourage old-age familial care by way of ‘cash grants... to couples who buy flats in close proximity to... their (elderly) parents’ (Teo 2010b: 340). Teo also finds that the state discourse on ‘filial piety’ has been etched into the fabric of the Singaporean society and it is widely accepted that it is the responsibility of adult children to care for their aged parents:
'Filial piety' was a phrase people used in conversations. ‘Asian values’ and ‘Confucian values’ were often uttered as well. These were invoked when I asked people to describe their relationships to their parents, what they thought about them becoming older and how they conceived of their care. People insisted on the importance of caring for their ageing parents, and the importance of ‘filial piety’ for society in general. (Teo 2010b: 349)

However, this responsibility of care is not borne equally by male and female adult children. While Teo (2010b) does not delve into the gendered assumptions of care, other scholars have argued that care work is perceived to be woman’s work and the bulk of elderly care is unpaid and provided by female family members (see Litt & Zimmerman 2003; Razavi 2007; Yeoh, Huang & Willis 2000).

In traditional kinship systems, the gendered division of care may have been feasible. However, globalisation has lead to people following where the work is, and smaller families and women’s labour force participation mean that familial eldercare is increasingly less feasible and more strenuous on women. Since social policies in Singapore fail to take into account the well-being of unpaid carers, it is likely that women engaged in familial care will have less opportunity to engage in formal employment and save, thus placing themselves in a more vulnerable position in old-age. Therefore, the emphasis on familial care without addressing the underlying gendered assumptions of care, could lead to an entrenchment and perpetuation of gender inequities – that is, women’s economic vulnerabilities vis-à-vis men in old-age, by reducing their opportunities for engaging in paid employment.

**Passing the ‘Buck’ From Madam to Maid**

However, informal eldercare work is not always unpaid and provided by family members. The more affluent Singaporeans are able to outsource care to female domestic workers: ‘at least one in every eight Singaporean households employs foreign domestic help as a means to resolve the crisis in household reproduction’ (Wong cited in Yeoh & Huang 2000: 416). With a small population and high growth aspirations, Singapore needs a labour force that is larger than its population size; it is reliant on foreign labour for both the high-end managerial jobs and the low-end menial jobs (Yeoh & Huang 2000). The state’s immigration laws favour the recruitment of domestic workers and this allows for the easy commodification of domestic work.

Yeoh and her colleagues from the National University of Singapore have carried out extensive research on foreign domestic workers in Singapore (for examples of studies, see Huang, Yeoh & Asis 2003; Lam, Yeoh & Huang 2006; Yeoh & Huang 1999, 2000, 2003; Yeoh, Huang & Gonzalez 1999; Yeoh, Huang & Willis 2000; Yeoh & Lam 2006). Yeoh is critical of how more affluent Singaporean women are strongly encouraged to transfer the physical burden of care by employing women from less economically developed states, namely the Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka:

> the intense focus on reproducing the middle-class way of life in Singapore has led to an easy glossing over of contradictions even among women themselves, noting that often, “women who have had a marked feminist-based repugnance against the foreign domestic maid scheme have shelved this and gone on to use the scheme after they themselves become mothers”. (Purushotam cited in Yeoh, Huang & Willis 2000: 154)

By passing the responsibility of care to the maid, the more affluent women are freed to engage in paid employment and save, thereby reducing their potential financial vulnerabilities in old-age. The less affluent Singaporean women however, do not share this privilege, thus, they are vulnerable to
remaining economically less well-off even in old-age. In this way, state policies in Singapore actually reinforce and perpetuate class differences. It is interesting to note that this point runs very similar to Phillipson’s (1982: 159) argument, that the system of capitalism allows class differences at birth to continue to exert a disproportionate influence on a person’s ‘quality of life and on the quantity of resources’ received until death; and in many ways, such inequalities are self-perpetuating.

Even so, while the more affluent woman is able to pass the ‘buck’ to the maid, feminist scholars have contended that she is not actually liberated from the gendered assumptions that care work is women’s work, for the wholly female contingent of foreign domestic maids rides on the same assumption that women are naturally predisposed to care (see Litt & Zimmerman 2003; Yeates 2005; Yeoh, Huang & Willis 2000). Further, the employer (the madam) continues to bear the emotional responsibility for her family’s wellbeing, although the physical burden of care has been passed on to the maid. As Yeoh and Huang (1999: 281) note, the domestic worker ‘is seldom perceived to amount to more than an appendage of the employer, who remains inextricably linked to the domestic realm’.

**Promoting Foreign Domestic Workers as a Cheaper Alternative to Familial Eldercare**

For all the state’s efforts at promoting familial care of the elderly, it also contradicts its stance on ‘filial piety’ to the extent that it encourages the outsourcing of old-age care to foreign domestic workers, who are not family. Working mothers in Singapore are entitled to claim ‘foreign maid levy relief’. According to the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, the ‘foreign maid levy relief’ is to ‘encourage married women to remain in the workforce and to encourage procreation’ (Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore 2011, emphasis in original). Singles and men are not entitled to claim the relief – a qualification, which attests to the gendered assumptions of care that underpin state policies.

In addition to encouraging foreign labour, another means of increasing the labour force is to encourage women’s participation in paid employment (Lam, Yeoh & Huang 2006). As shown earlier, tax policies are formulated to encourage mothers to continue in formal employment. It appears therefore, that when faced with a choice between choosing ‘filial piety’ and economic growth, state policies favour the latter. Conveniently, by outsourcing elderly care to foreign domestic workers, the state can not only bolster its labour force through increasing women’s participation, but it can also avoid incurring the burden of providing formal care for the elderly.

**CONCLUSION**

In this paper, I argued that economic growth matters more as far as the elderly and their demand for care is concerned. I highlighted that there is a persistent and purveying economic frame to development theory and practice as applied to the issue of informal eldercare. This can be seen from the macro to the micro level. Firstly, at the macro level, the dominant theoretical frameworks of modernisation and dependency theory carry an implicit economic frame, within which the weaker socioeconomic status of the elderly is seen as a product, if not a victim, of economic development.

Secondly, at the state level, governments in Southeast and East Asia are driven by an ideology that values economic growth over social equity and welfare. As such, elderly care is constructed through state discourse on ‘filial piety’, as the responsibility of the family, not the state.

Thirdly, within the family, the responsibility for old-age care is passed on to women, which reduces their opportunity to engage in paid employment. In Singapore, the more affluent women are encouraged through tax incentives to transfer the physical burden of care to foreign domestic
workers so that they can join the labour force and contribute to economic growth. Underpinning this is the ‘developmental’ ideology of the relentless pursuit of economic growth and prosperity. I argue that to the extent that informal eldercare is subordinated to growth, so are the elderly marginalised in development theory and practice.

**Directions for Further Research**

Existing policies and scholarly literature on the political economy of care for the elderly tend to address the current status of the elderly, rather than question how the current situation came about. This symptomatic approach is more concerned with policy than theoretical implications and it does not satisfactorily address the root causes of social inequities. Despite challenges from the ‘Human Development’ approach and others since the 1970s, there remain gaps in understanding and approach to dealing with socioeconomic inequities relating to the elderly that may be a result of economic growth, or that remained unresolved even after growth was achieved. Given Singapore’s dominant economic development paradigm as a ‘developmental’ state, the country is a suitable place to examine this link between economic development and the status of the elderly. In conclusion, I put forward two gaps in the literature, which point the way for further research.

Firstly, as pointed by Aboderin (2004: 43-4), what is lacking from the existing theoretical frameworks includes a clear understanding of: (1) the motives and attitudes of the younger generation in providing material support to the older generation; (2) the past experiences of the elderly in providing support to the previous generation; and (3) the expectations and attitudes of both generations with regards to receiving old-age support. Such research is ‘urgently needed’ especially in the developing and ‘developmental’ states, where policy is in its infancy; developed nations could also benefit from such study but arguably, the need is less pressing as there are already in place systems of social welfare (Aboderin 2004: 45).

Secondly, the voices of the elderly are underrepresented in the literature. In writing about the current state of literature on the elderly, the United Nations points out ‘while much data and analysis are available on population ageing, data and information about the lives and situation of older persons are strikingly lacking’ (United Nations 2010: v). I agree with this point and submit that scholarship on the relationship between (economic) development and the place of the elderly could benefit from a consideration of the older generation’s own interpretation of their present situation and recollection of the past. As Aboderin urges, such information ‘can be acquired using life or oral history approaches’ (2004: 44). Hendricks (1996) also highlights a point of critical importance when he states that much of the literature has been written by scholars who have not experienced old-age themselves. To this point, I agree with Hendricks that ‘the pitfalls of writing... about an experience... not yet encountered’, may be avoided by including qualitative research, which ‘will be more sensitive to the actual experiences of the elderly’ (Silverman cited in Hendricks 1996: 68).
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