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Japan – The Tiny Dwarf?
Sino-Japanese Relations
from the Kangxi to the Early Qianlong Reigns

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In 1611, Zhou Xinru 周性如, a Chinese merchant from Nanjing, reached Japan via the Gōto Islands. He was granted an audience with Tokugawa Ieyasu 德川家康 (1542–1616; r. 1603–1616) whom he asked to exert stricter control over Japanese pirates. If his request was granted, he promised to bring back a Chinese “kanhe 勘合 certificate” the next year, these certificates being part of China’s reference to her alleged vassal or tribute states. Thereupon, the Japanese Bakufu prepared two letters written by Ieyasu’s Neo-Confucian advisor, Hayashi Razan 林羅山 (1583–1657), which were handed to Zhou Xinru for him to deliver to the military governor of Fujian, Chen Zizhen 陳子貞 (1547–1611). Chen was one of the advocates of a stricter policy against Japanese piracy. These letters – mention of which I could not trace in Chinese sources – had some remarkable characteristics. In contrast to the former “vassal letters” (biao 表) used throughout the Ming, they showed no sign that Ieyasu intended to consider himself a vassal of the Chinese emperor. Although both letters formally repeated the request for a restoration of the kanhe 勘合 tally trade with China, they indicated that the Japanese were actually not interested in a revival of the traditional tribute trade, but rather sought mutual relations in which both sides could treat each other as equals:

“… to want to reform the exchange of envoys but yet ask for an acceptance of the kanhe tally trade, this is not what the merits of a revival of old customs consists in. Although our country lies at the outer edge of the seas where the sun rises, it is repressingly and commonly designated

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1 Li Xianzhang 李献璋, Nagasaki Tōjin no kenkyū 長崎唐人の研究 (Sasebo: Shinwa ginkō, 1991), p. 131.
as the ‘tiny dwarf country’ (*cui’erguo蕞爾國*)⁶; with the idea of considering important things as small, the Chinese do not think to give up this (attitude); hence, what is requested every year upon arrival, is the reception of envoys with tallies as something consequently being a blessing for [the country] lying east of the seas. But what all the [Asian] people (*lishu 黎庶*, lit. black-haired) are looking for, is that China, although it is established as a weighty and valuable country, does not shake off the idea of love without distinction both near and far!*⁷

This quotation clearly shows that Ieyasu was unhappy with China’s attitude towards her neighbours, which he considered to be characterized by political and ideological arrogance. Instead of accepting the role of China’s vassal or tribute state for his country, he initiated his own seal, the vermilion seal (*shuin 朱印*), which was also granted to Zhou Xingru. This alone suggested that Ieyasu intended to create his own trade regulations to show his independence and authority from China. In contrast to the *kanhe* certificates which were only issued to vassal states, the vermilion seals were issued to both Chinese and Japanese traders. Ieyasu’s attempts to establish contacts with China, albeit indirectly via Korea and the Ryūkyūs, should be interpreted in this sense. As we shall see below, this did not, however, mean that China was no longer of interest to Japan.

Ieyasu never received a reply to this letter. Due to the lack of information, we can only speculate as to whether Zhou Xingru delivered the letters to the Fujian authorities and if so, whether the latter had failed to forward them to Beijing, perhaps because of the lack of respect and formal subordination.⁸ These letters had to be the last attempt at a direct approach with China and they showed clear evidence of Japan’s rising self-confidence.⁹

Rising self-confidence and increasing political control of foreign trade went hand in hand with Japan’s attempts to make her own economy more self-sufficient. When the supply of Chinese commodities declined due to the temporary maritime trade prohibition under Kangxi (between 1662 and 1683/4), a greater involvement of the Japanese government in foreign trade can be discerned.¹⁰ Later, the so-called *Kyōhō* reforms 享保改革 (1716–1736) was launched by Tokugawa Yoshimune 德川吉宗 (r.

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⁶ For the use of this expression see also below in my discussion of China’s reaction to Japan’s new policy.

⁷ *Tsūkō ichiran*, vol. 5, j. 207, p. 342. The trading and the establishment of markets at Nagasaki were furthermore considered of advantage to both China and Japan (*qi fei erguo zhi li hu豈非二國之利乎*). See also Mizuno Norihito, “China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations” (2003), p. 121.

⁸ We should perhaps also take into account that Chen Zizhen had died in 1611.

⁹ For Japan’s trade with Luzon at the time of the invasion of Korea and the overseas trade planned and carried out by Katō Kiyomasa 加藤清正 (1562–1611), such as the purchase of munitions like lead and saltpeter, see Nakajima Gakushō 中島楽章, “The Invasion of Korea and Trade with Luzon: Katō Kiyomasa’s Scheme of the Luzon Trade in the Late Sixteenth Century”, in Angela Schottenhammer (ed.), *The East Asian “Mediterranean”* (2008), pp. 145–168.

1716–1745; 1684–1751) aimed mainly at strengthening the country’s economy and financial solvency by increasing the use of commercial capital in the domestic economy. A major problem Japan was experiencing was her reliance on foreign trade as a source of goods. One important measure was therefore the attempt to substitute imports by the promotion of Japan’s domestic production, in order to stop the outflow of metals. Silk manufacture and sugar production may be taken as examples. 11 Japan’s new self-confidence as well as her new strength under the Tokugawa rulers gradually led to various changes and, thus, to a new quality in the bilateral relations between China and Japan, which officially restricted the trade with China.

In the next segment of this article, Japan’s new policy will be introduced, to be followed in the second part by some concrete examples concerning the exchange of knowledge (on medicine, horsemanship), of persons (physicians, veterinarians), and goods (horses, books), in order to show that an active interest in China remained in Japan. In the third part, China’s reaction to Japan’s new trading policy will be examined more thoroughly. As will become evident, the so-called “Zhu-brothers” played an important role not only in Japan but also in terms of China’s Japan policy. Smuggling (nukeni 拔荷) was a customary part of the whole process of trade, 12 or, to use the words of a local interpreter, after the Dutch had repeatedly complained about the rampant smuggling of the Chinese: “(T)he Chinese have to smuggle in order to render their business profitable.” 13

JAPAN’S NEW CHINA POLICY

The new attitude of the Tokugawa rulers restricted but also at the same time greatly encouraged and enforced mutual exchange with China. In the course of the seventeenth century, we can observe that regulations on Chinese merchants trading in Japan gradually became stricter. As a producer of gold, silver and copper, Japan was an extremely attractive destination for the Chinese and the number of Chinese going to Nagasaki rose dramatically in the early years of Manchu rule, reaching up to 10,000 per year. This, so the German physician Engelbert Kaempfer (1651–1716) tells us, increasingly induced the suspicion of “the cautious and suspicious Japanese”, as a consequence of which the freedom the Chinese had enjoyed for many years was more and more restricted. 14 But this did not mean that the China trade was no longer desired

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12 For numerous examples cf. Tsūkō ichiran, see vol. 4, passim.

13 Paul van der Velde & Rudolf Bachofner, *The Deshima Diaries. Marginalia 1700–1740*. (Tōkyō: The Japan-Netherlands Institute, 1992), p. 69. Deshima Series, ed. by J. L. Blussé and W. G. J. Remmelink, *Japan-Netherlands Institute Scientific Publications of the Japan-Netherlands Institute*, No. 12 (henceforth abbreviated to Deshima Diaries). Opperoofd Harmanus Menssingh observed in December 1705: “While the Chinese were shipping their copper, they were blatantly smuggling. The smuggling is condoned by the governor of Nagasaki, otherwise it could not take place.” I would like to express my thanks to Leonard Blussé for drawing my attention to this source.

or welcomed. The fact that trade with the Chinese was not prohibited but put under tighter control implied that the Japanese rulers still wanted to trade and exchange knowledge with the Chinese, while simultaneously trying to strengthen their domestic economy. In this context, as we shall see below, they even found themselves in a kind of contradictory situation of ensuring that trade restrictions and additional fees did not on the other hand bring the China trade to a complete standstill.

A first restriction was the “itowappu糸割符” system\textsuperscript{15}, consisting of a single set of prices for silk imports from China and a regulation for their distribution in cities,\textsuperscript{16} which was applied to Chinese ships by a decision in 1631.\textsuperscript{17} Thereupon, trading activities with Chinese ships outside of Nagasaki were prohibited. The restrictions limited the mobility of the Chinese in Nagasaki. In 1635, the trade with China became concentrated in Nagasaki, although the authorities were aware of the fact that an uncertain number of merchant vessels still traded at Satsuma薩摩.\textsuperscript{18} The Chinese merchants, as a rule, communicated with the Japanese through Chinese language interpreters (Tō tsūji唐通事) engaged by the local Nagasaki Magistrate (Nagasakibugyō長崎奉行). The “tsūji” were not just interpreters: they recorded the cargoes of incoming ships, kept records of arriving passengers, inspected the ships and the literature carried on board, and supervised the conduct of trade. They consequently functioned as the essential middlemen between the Chinese (and Dutch) traders and the Japanese authorities and merchants.\textsuperscript{19} Whereas during the reign of Hideyoshi none of the shogunate administrators (bugyō) had actually resided in Nagasaki and Chinese traders had a relatively easy life at the port, the policy changed significantly with the Tokugawa rulers. The shogunate administrator (bugyō) of Kyūshū employed 1,041 officials in 1681, a figure which had almost doubled by 1724.\textsuperscript{20} Such administrative


\textsuperscript{17} Nagasaki-ken shi, pp. 177, 181 and 182.

\textsuperscript{18} Tsūkō ichiran, vol. 5, j. 198, p. 228.

\textsuperscript{19} For details on the historical background and the activities of the interpreters, cf. for example Hayashi Rokurō林陸朗, Nagasaki Tō tsūji長崎唐通事. (Tōkyō: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 2000).

\textsuperscript{20} Toyama Mikio外山幹夫, Nagasaki bugyō: Edo bakufu no mimi to me長崎奉行: 江戸幕府の耳と目 (Tōkyō: Chūō kōron, 1988), pp. 68–69. For further information on early seventeenth century China in Tokugawa Japan’s eyes, see Mizuno Norihiito, “China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The
changes could reflect the *shōguns’* attempts to gain better control over foreign trade. In order to better control the Chinese and their smuggling activities in Nagasaki, and perhaps also to consolidate the price of copper\(^{21}\), the Chinese who had hitherto been able to live and move freely in the city, were eventually confined to residing within an enclosed, walled settlement of about 230 to 130 metres in 1689, the *Tōjin yashiki* 唐人屋敷 (Chinese Compound).\(^{22}\) According to a brief eyewitness report by Engelbert Kaempfer, the compound was established on a small flat hill close to the shore by Nagasaki harbour, a place which had formerly served as a “pleasure garden” half the size of Dejima with rare Japanese and foreign plants:

“...(D)iesen Platz bauete man so geschwind als möglich inwendig mit verschiedenen Reihen kleiner Häuser von Holz, und zwar jede Reihe unter ein allgemeines Dach, aus, und befestigte ihn auswendig mit Gräben, hölzernen Gittern, gedoppelten Thoren und einer starken Wache, so, daß das ganze Revier, das noch im Anfange des Februars die Augen mit dem angenehmsten Lust- und Blumengarten ergötzte, schon im Maimonat die abscheuliche Gestalt eines Kerkers hatte, der nur für die sinesische Nation zur Verwahrung und Wohnung dienen muste, und wofür ihr jährlich ein Miethgeld von 1600 Thails zu bezahlen auferlegt wurde. So gut also als die Holländer auf Desima, sitzen die Sinesen die Zeit ihrer Anwesenheit über an diesem Orte eingesperrt, und lassen sich aus Liebe zum Gewin eine so verdriesliche Behandlung gefallen....”\(^{23}\)

He observed that the Japanese treatment of the Chinese was different from that of the Dutch, noting that Japanese officials and interpreters actually treated the Chinese discourteously. As they were only considered as private merchants (Privatkauf-leute), they were even beaten if something irregular happened.\(^{24}\) The Chinese were not given the quasi official status like the Dutch but treated in the same manner as Japanese merchants (*akindo dōzen* 商人同然). The important point here, I argue, is that tighter control of the Chinese in Japan were underpinned by economic reasons and not simply psychological, political, or ideological ones (for example to display their sense of equality or perhaps even superiority) in face of the arrogance with which their countrymen were treated under China’s official policy, or the fear that even the Chinese might import Christians or texts of Christian content\(^{25}\).

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\(^{25}\) Ibid. p. 125.

In the course of the increasingly tighter control of Chinese merchants, a so-called “nengyō ji 年行司” (a position for the administration of the Chinese settlement filled by representatives and officials of the town, Tō nengyō ji 唐年行司, Tō meaning “Chinese”) was established in 1635 (kan’ei 12). In 1624 (kan’ei 1), a representative of the inner city (uchimachi no otona 内町の乙名) was appointed as nengyō ji for the first time. In 1638 (kan’ei 15), a representative of the outer city (sotomachi no otona 外町の乙名) was appointed to serve as nengyō ji (also called jōgyō ji 常行司). These two nengyō ji positions existed for a while, one for the inner city of Nagasaki (uchimachi nengyō ji) and one for the outer city (sotomachi nengyō ji). In 1687 (jōkyō 4), a system of two officials being employed both in the inner and in the outer city was initiated. When the separation between inner and outer city was abolished in 1699 (genroku 12), the designation “jōgyō ji” was no longer used. In 1672, the shogunate officially changed more liberal trade regulations to the so-called “Market Trade System” (kanmotsu shihō 貨物市法; or Taxatie Handel in Dutch). In 1685, the Jōkyō regulations were introduced, a kind of revival of the itowappu system, though with some differences. Of particular importance in our context is the change in the kind of payment for Chinese and Dutch imports: no longer should silver and gold be used as payment but copper and other goods, especially marine products. In addition, in order to prevent smuggling and the influx of Christian elements into Japan, a system of personal guarantors (akenin sei 請人制) was introduced. China’s “formerly free terms of trade”, thus underwent a “reformation” in 1685.

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26 Nagasaki-ken shi, p. 393. The Tō nengyō ji was a kind of self-administration of the Chinese settlement in Nagasaki managed by rich Chinese merchants appointed by the Bakufu to supervise the local Chinese community and take care that everybody respected Japanese law. It was first established in 1635. This authority, thus, became a second element in the local administration after the most important one, the interpreters office (Tō tsūji 唐通事; the Dutch of course had their own interpreters). Even though they were interpreters in name, their actual functions were much wider. In all, there were about 150 Dutch and 200 Chinese interpreters. Originally, there were six Chinese merchants responsible for the nengyō ji, namely Ouyang Yutai 歐陽雲, He Sanguan 何三官, Jiang Qiguan 江七官, Jiang Sanguan 江三官, He Baguan 何八官 and Chen Yishan 陳奕山, who also represented various Chinese merchants’ groups (bang 助). For details see Li Xianzhang, Nagasaki Tōjin no kenkyū (1999), pp. 179–259 (passim), esp. p. 277.


28 Originally (since 1592, that is bunroku 1), a “machi doshiyori 町年寄” and a “machi otona 町乙名” were established. Cf. Yamawaki Teijirō, Nagasaki no Tōjin bōeki (1964), p. 292. See also Nagasaki-ken shi, pp. 421–429.


31 Nagasaki-ken shi, pp. 316, 319–323.

32 Nagasaki-ken shi, p. 512.

In 1688, the Japanese government also started to restrict the total number of ships being allowed to enter the harbour of Nagasaki,\(^{34}\) and around 1698 the “Nagasaki Accounting House” (Nagasaki kaisho 長崎会所, or Geldkamer in Dutch) was established.\(^{35}\) In 1715, the Shōtoku export restrictions (Shōtoku shinrei 正德新例 or kaihaku gōshi shinrei 海舶互市新例)\(^{36}\) were instituted to reorganize the Nagasaki trade. Two commissioners of foreign trade were appointed to Edo and Nagasaki, and thirty Chinese and two Dutch vessels permitted entry each year.\(^{37}\) At the same time, the export of copper was restricted. In addition, trade permissions (shinpai 信牌, in Chinese sources also referred to as Wozhao 倭照) for foreign ships were issued\(^{38}\), which, according to the Huangchao

\(^{34}\) In spring, summer, and autumn respectively only a fixed number of vessels was permitted from several ports of departure. During spring time, in all 20 ships (5 from Nanjing, 7 from Ningbo, 6 from Fuzhou, and 2 from Putuooshan 普陀山); during summer, in all 30 ships (3 from Nanjing, 4 from Quanzhou, 4 from Ningbo, 3 from Zhangzhou, 5 from Xiamen, 4 from Fuzhou, 2 from Guangdong, 2 from Yaoliuba 咬留吧 (Batavia), 1 from Jianpuzhai 東埔寨 (Cambodia), 1 from Putuooshan, and 1 from Taini 太泥), and in winter again 20 (2 from Nanjing, 3 from Jiaozhou 胶洲, 2 from Xianluo 達羅, 3 from Fuzhou, 4 from Guangdong, 2 from Gaozhou, 2 from Chaozhou, 1 from Ningbo, and 1 from Dongjing). Cf. Kimiya Yasuhiko 木宮泰彥, transl. by Chen Jie 陳捷, ZhongRi jiaotong shi 中日交通史. (Taibei: Shangwu yinshuguan, no date), in Wang Yunwu 王雲五 (ed.), Wanyou wenku huiyao 萬有文庫薈要. 2 vols., vol. 2, pp. 337–338.

\(^{35}\) Nagasaki-ken shi, p. 553. The office was responsible for the purchase of Chinese and Dutch imports and was managed by local officials appointed by the Nagasaki bugyō.

\(^{36}\) Named according to the shōtoku era (1711–1716). See Tsūkō ichiran, vol. 5, p. 311, for regulations concerning the Chinese.


wenxian tongkao 皇朝文獻通考, were sold for 8,000 to 9,000 silver liang each.\(^{39}\) According to an entry by Li Fu 李紱 (1675–1750) from 1736 (qianlong 1, 1\(^{st}\) month, 17\(^{th}\) day), the Japanese issued “large certificates” (dazhao 大照), for which they demanded 2,600 to 2,700 silver liang, and “small certificates” (xiaozhao 小照), for which they demanded 1,700 to 1,800 silver liang, without specifying the qualitative difference between the two certificates.\(^{40}\) Ji Zengyun 姬曾筠 (1671–1739) further explained that the “xiaozhao” were also called “fuzhao 浮照” (that is, certificates for excess purchases).\(^{41}\) This statement is substantiated by another quotation from the Huangchao wenxian tongkao which said that “(i)n addition, there is an extra quota, for which they are provided with small permits (xiaozhao 小照), but only for 100 to 200 boxes (of copper); (the permits) may be used for two to three years and are subsequently thrown away.”\(^{42}\) “Fuzhao” would consequently be another designation of the “xiaozhao”, it could be used for two to three years, and apparently permitted a copper merchant to purchase 100 to 200 boxes of extra copper in addition to the regular quota. This consequently induced the travelling merchants to ask the Japanese to provide them with more than the fixed number of certificates (e wai fu ji 额外浮給) and, thus, with potentially more copper.\(^{43}\) Another memorial by Ji Zengyun noted that each certificate (Wozhao) was sold for “several thousand liang”, the price not being uniform or standardized.\(^{44}\) In this later memorial, Ji Zengyun further explained that there existed a

\(^{39}\) Huangchao wenxian tongkao 皇朝文獻通考 by Qianlong 青籟 (1711–1799), Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 (1672–1755) et al. (comp.), j. 17, p. 30b: 昔年各商初往東洋時倭人設立倭照每張約費銀八九千兩不等.

\(^{40}\) “Wei mai tong zhi guanshang jiaokun qing yong Diantong yi zhi Wo jiao 為買銅之官商交困請用滇銅以制倭狡...” (entry by Li Fu 李紱, 1675–1750), in Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe caizhenglei huobi jinshu xiang 宮中硃批奏折財政類貨幣金融項 (1736, 1\(^{st}\) month, 17\(^{th}\) day). He subsequently enumerates other costs like ship rental, expenses for food and sailors, etc., and concludes that a Chinese copper merchant had to forward about 5,000 to 6,000 silver liang.

\(^{41}\) See “Wei jing chen tongzheng shi 為敬陳銅政事” (entry by Ji Zengyun 姬曾筠, 1671–1739), in Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe caizhenglei huobi jinshu xiang 宮中硃批奏折財政類貨幣金融項 (1736, 10\(^{th}\) month, 13\(^{th}\) day) and “Tongshang kuikong yinliang bing xianzai banli qingxing tong 銅商虧空銀兩並現在辦理情形” (entry by Ji Zengyun), in Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe caizhenglei huobi jinrong xiang 宮中硃批奏折財政類貨幣金融項 (1736, qianlong 2, 5\(^{th}\) month, 3\(^{rd}\) (?) day). Ji Zengyun was appointed governor (later governor-general) of Zhejiang and was charged with the construction of a sea wall in Zhejiang in 1736. Cf. Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period. 2 vols. (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 1991), vol. 1, p. 120.

\(^{42}\) Huangchao wenxian tongkao, j. 295, p. 45b. For these extra boxes of copper, see also p. 354 of this article.

\(^{43}\) “Wei jing chen tongzheng shi” (entry by Ji Zengyun).

\(^{44}\) See “Tongshang kuikong yinliang bing xianzai banli qingxing 同商虧空銀兩並現在辦理情形” (entry by Ji Zengyun).
distinction between “Wozhao” and “fuzhao” (or “xiaozhao”). This would imply that 
Wozhao as a rule referred to what is also called “dazhao” (large certificate).

What these entries also show is that the Japanese obviously fixed the prices of the 
Wozhao according to their own interests. The “large certificates” were most probably 
valid for a longer time period and consequently also permitted its owner to obtain 
greater quantities of copper.

As recent research has emphasized, it is less well known that these Shōtoku regulations 
were changed and adjusted in the following years. The number of Chinese ships, for 
example, was raised again to forty. But the amount of copper exported declined over the 
following years. We will see below how the Chinese government reacted to all these 
new regulations and restrictions.

In the context of copper exports, as Bettina Gramlich-Oka has shown, the aim of the 
shogunate was to improve the supply of export copper rather than to restrict its export. 
The prohibition to export copper (because the metal was needed for the minting of a 
new copper coin in Japan) was valid only for nine years between 1638 and 1646 and 
again in 1668. Already in 1699, responsible Japanese merchants had difficulties in 
transporting the required quantities of copper to Nagasaki on time, a fact that 
subsequently led to an official inspection. In addition, mines were not able to meet the 
increasing demand for copper. In 1701, the Japanese government even opened a copper 
office (dōza 銅座), which managed the transport of copper until 1712/13, when it was 
closed down again, because it was unable to secure the transportation of enough copper 
for export. The system was subsequently reformed and, eventually, the Nagasaki bugyō 
was ordered to purchase copper from copper merchants in Japan. Nevertheless, 
problems in the procurement of export copper to Nagasaki remained, and Chinese 
merchants and officials were quite dissatisfied with the low copper imports from Japan. 
The fact is that already in 1701 the Kangxi Emperor had dispatched a “secret agent” to 
Japan, in order to find out why the quantities of silver imported through the Japan trade 
had suddenly significantly decreased. This secret agent was a Manchu bondservant,

45 See Bettina Gramlich-Oka, “Shogunal Administration of Copper in the Mid-Tokugawa Period 
46 Cf. Bettina Gramlich-Oka, “Shogunal Administration of Copper” (2008), p. 95. The shogunate, for 
example, began to purchase a proportion of copper directly from the mines and sent it to the refiners 
in Osaka
47 Bettina Gramlich-Oka, op. cit., p. 72.
48 Bettina Gramlich-Oka, op. cit., pp. 80–81, 84 and 89–90, 97. Purchase and transport to Nagasaki 
were subsequently managed by the Ōsaka city magistrate to the copper guild, which by that time 
consisted in seventeen members who established the so-called Ōsaka dōkaisha 大阪銅会所 or 
dōfukuya kaisha 銅吹屋会所 (p. 90).
49 While the estimated silver imports into China from Japan between 1676 and 1685 amounted to 116 
metric tons, this quantity significantly declined in the following years and only reached 13.7 metric 
tons between 1686 and 1700. For these figures see Richard von Glahn, “Myth and Reality of 
China’s Seventeenth Century Monetary Crisis”, The Journal of Economic History, 56:2 (1996), 
429–454, p. 444. Kangxi qiju zhu 康熙起居注. Edited by the Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’an guan 中國 
the chief clerk (ulinda 乌林達) of the Imperial Silk Manufactory (zhizao ju 織造局) in Hangzhou, Morsen 莫爾森. Disguised as a merchant, Morsen sailed from Shanghai in the summer of 1701 and returned to Ningbo in the autumn of the same year. This story was later recalled by the Yongzheng Emperor who said that “Morsen’s report contained many fabrications and empty words” like claiming that Japan was weak and obedient. “Subsequently”, so Yongzheng continued, “no more heed was paid to that, and the opening up of the ocean [by the Japanese] actually started from that time” (cihou sui bu jieyi, kaiyang zhi ju, yi you ci qi 此後隨不介意開洋之舉亦由此起).

Morsen’s report obviously influenced the Kangxi Emperor to such an extent that fifteen years later, when the Shōtoku restrictions were enforced in Japan and every Chinese merchant had to possess a valid Japanese trading certificate, he was in no sense worried about the new Japanese regulations. After the export restrictions were issued, several local Chinese officials sent memorials to the Kangxi Emperor. Although he immediately saw the danger for China’s copper imports from Japan, he considered the trade permissions (shinpai) as something completely different in nature from the Chinese certificates and did not see any necessity to inquire about the political and economic background behind Japan’s new policy. Whereas the nine chief ministers of state (jiuqing 九卿) were of the opinion that every merchant who accepted the new Japanese trade credentials, as Hu Yunke 胡雲客 and others had done, should be punished for having committed a crime and the merchants should rather conduct trade as before according to the old regulations, Kangxi rejected such petitions.

Due largely to restrictions on both sides, smuggling was not an infrequent phenomenon. Both Chinese and Japanese sources attest to this fact. As Chinese merchants very often had to leave the port of Nagasaki with many goods unsold, they tried to sell these things to Japanese smugglers (Schleichtändler) in the nearby waters, as Kaempfer observed.

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zhizaoren guohai guan bi maoyi, qi xian maoyi zhi yin shen duo, houlai jianshao 朕曾遣織造人過海觀彼貿易其先貿易之銀甚多後來減少”.

50 He was a member of the Bordered Blue Banner. See Baqi Manzhou shizu tongpu 八旗滿洲氏族通譜 (1745), j. 75, p. 6b (under the entry Wang Ai 王艾). Accordingly, he was originally employed as a sixth rank official.


52 Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi 世宗憲皇帝硃批諭旨 by Yongzheng 雍正 (1677–1735) and Qianlong 乾隆 (1711–1799), j. 174, section 8, pp. 28a–b, in Siku quanshu, fasc. 424.


Not infrequently, however, they were caught by Japanese watchmen and sentenced to death. A particular role within the smuggling network in Japanese waters at that time was played by Satsuma, as expressed in Kaempfer’s words:

“Eben hierunter aber gehen sehr oft Unterschleife vor, indem manchmal einige, die im Frühjahr nach gehaltenem Verkauf zurückfahren, ihre Schiffe mit frischer Farbe und Fürnis überziehen, und darauf alsbald zum andern mal mit anderem Volk und Waaren gleich wieder erscheinen, und glücklich passieren, ohne daß der Betrug entdeckt wird; einige pflegen auch wohl, fünnemlich, wenn sie im Frühjahre auslaufen, sich mit allem Vorsaz auf Satsuma zu verschlagen, und in der Geschwindigkeit da ihre Waaren zu verkaufen, alsden so fort zurückzueilen, um zum zweitenmal ihr Schiff mit einer neuen Ladung zu versehen, und damit nach Nagasacki zu kommen; in dem Falle aber, daß sie etwa auf der Farth nach Satsuma von den japanischen Kapern (die zur Verhütung des Schleichhandels an den Ufern umher kreuzen) wirklich betroffen würden, geben sie vor, als hätten sie ungern und unwissend des rechten Weges verfehlt, und lenken sich sodan wieder auf den Nagasackischen Hafen, mithin auf die erlaubte Straße.”

As is well-known, this kind of illegal trade at Satsuma also had its official aspect: after the “seclusion policy” was initiated, the Tokugawa shogunate for example required from Satsuma, among other things, the delivery of more Chinese drugs, which, if not from time to time directly sold in Satsuma waters, were primarily imported via the Ryūkyū Islands, which had been invaded by Satsuma in 1609.

The change in policy was accompanied by changing attitudes in the literary and ideological sphere. A new view of China in Japan may be observed in a work entitled *Kai hentai* 華夷変態 (Metamorphosis from civilized to barbarian). It was composed by Hayashi Gahō 林鵞峰 (1618–1680), Hayashi Razan’s son. The preface reveals that the author understood the Manchu conquest as China’s transformation from a “civilized” to a “barbarian, un-civilized” nation. At the same time, the Japanese ruling élit e was increasingly interested in knowledge about China. Numerous texts from the time period under investigation provide evidence for this, and Chinese scholars, merchants, travellers, and “scientists” such as physicians, greatly contributed to an improvement in the knowledge about China and Chinese.

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56 Cf. for example *Tsūkō ichiran*, vol. 5, j. 198, p. 228.


58 Officially, it was not permitted for Satsuma or the rest of Japan to maintain free trade relations with China at that time. Satsuma therefore maintained the fiction of Ryūkyū’s “independence”, and encouraged the kingdom to cultivate her relations with China, while at the same time strictly supervising the islands.

59 *Kai hentai* 華夷変態 by Hayashi Gahō 林鵞峰 (1618–1680) (also Hayashi Harukatsu 林春勝 or Hayashi Shunsai 林春齋) and Hayashi Nobuatsu 林信篤 (1644–1732). (Tōkyō: Tōyō bunko, Shōwa 33–34 [1958-1959]).
Among the works that circulated widely in Japan was the Shinchō tanji 清朝採事 (Inquiries about China) – also known as Dai Shin chōya mondō 大清王朝問答 (Questions and answers on the Great Qing Dynasty), Shinjin mondōsho 清人問答書 (Book on questions and answers with Qing people) or Kyōhō hitsuwa 享保筆話 (Notes from the kyōhō period) – a record of questions and answers concerning Qing period China. Questions basically concerned topics such as “ki-butsu 器物” (implements), “saisō 祭葬” (festivals and funerals), “ifuku 衣服” (clothing), “shikō 嗜好” (tastes), “seiji 政治” (government), and “fūzoku 風俗” (customs), and also medical problems. One important figure who provided the Japanese with information on China was Zhu Peizhang 朱佩章, a doctor and Confucian scholar, native of Tingzhou 汀州 in Fujian, who went to Japan in the second month of 1725 (kyōhō 10) together with his two younger brothers, Zhu Zizhang 朱子章, and Zhu Laizhang 朱來章. In the kyōhō era, according to a later commentary to the work, Ogyū Sōshichirō 赴生總七郎 was ordered to question Zhu Peizhang. Fukami Kudayū 深見九大夫 (1691–1773) recorded Zhu Peizhang’s replies to the questions and submitted them:
“When in the early kyōhō period, Fukami Kudayū – who was later also called [Fukami] Shinbei and who was the son of Kō Gentai 高玄岱 (1639–1722) – was ordered to go to Nagasaki in Hi(zen) province to investigate matters related to medicinal plants, he also received an instruction to question the Chinese who had arrived at Nagasaki. The dialogue [between Fukami Kudayū and the Chinese] was later compiled as a book, recording the replies of the Chinese from the Qing (empire), named Zhu Peizhang. Somebody for whom the Confucian official, Ogyū 获生, had translated the questions into Japanese for the Court, considered it as appropriate to prepare and preserve this account.

With my entire heart I have eagerly longed to copy and safely preserve this account. Mr Fukami was the representative for books and documents (shoseki bugyō 書籍奉行) at that time.”

8th month, 1764. Recorded by Sōshōdō 双松堂 (unknown).”

In addition to the Shinchō tanji we possess yet another report on questions and answers related to Zhu Peizhang – the Shioki kata mondōsho 仕置方問答書 (Questions and answers concerning governance). Various entries about his visits to Japan can be found in the Tsūkō ichiran. Zhu Peizhang was, thus, repeatedly questioned by the Japanese, especially about medical matters.

MEDICINE AND PHYSICIANS

The kidnapping or human-smuggling of Chinese physicians to Japan was common in seventeenth century East Asia. A certain Xu Zhilin 徐之遴 (c. 1599–1678) was kidnapped in 1619 (genwa 元和 5) and taken to Japan, where his career really took off. He first worked for the local daimyō of Satsuma, and subsequently, in 1624, was employed by the daimyō of Hyūga 日向, Itō Sukenori 伊東祐慶 (1589–1636), also

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64 Most probably he was responsible for making sure that the trade with medicinal plants was carried out properly.

65 See Ōba Osamu (ed.), Kyōhō jidai no Nit-Chū kankei shiryō (1995), p. 731. This passage is included in a copy of the Kyōhō hitsuwa 享保筆話 (1764) held by the Tōkyō University Library. There are more works with the title Shinchō tanji which have a slightly different content which may have to do with additional or other questions raised.

66 Shioki kata mondōsho 仕置方問答書, in ZSSXDJ, pp. 79–108.


named Mr Tōzen 東禅公, as personal physician (shiyou 侍醫). After Itō Sukenori’s death, Xu worked for his successor, Itō Sukehisa 祐久 (c. 1608–1657), also named Mr Jī’un 慈雲公, and eventually died in Japan in 1678.\(^69\) More famous than Xu Zhilin were Chen Yuanyun 陳元観 (1587?–1671), Chen Mingde 陳明德\(^70\), author of the Xinyi lu (Shin’i roku) 心醫錄 (Record on the treatment of heart and emotional disturbances), and Dai Mangong 戴曼公 (Tai Mankō or Dokuryū Shōeki 独立性易)\(^71\). Chen Yuanyun travelled to Japan around 1619 and, like Xu Zhilin, later died there. He is said to have had a major influence on the spread of the martial art of fighting with the bare fist 空手 and Jūdō 柔道 in Japan. Shinobu Joken 信夫怒軒 described him as the great-grandfather of kung fu (gu ci yi Yuanyun wei bizu 故此技以元贇為鼻祖).\(^72\) Chen Mingde reached Japan in 1618; Dai Mangong in 1653. Chen Mingde was permitted to reside in Nagasaki and even changed his name to Egawa Nyōtoku 頴川入徳.\(^73\) Lu Wenzhai 陸文齋, a doctor from Hangzhou, followed in 1703, upon an order issued in 1702 to bring a doctor from China, but he had no intention of prolonging his stay in Japan. During his sojourn in Nagasaki he carried out discussions with the Nagasaki shogunate administrators, Nagai Naochika 永井直允 (Nagasaki bugyō between 1702–1709) and Bessho Tsuneharu 別所常治 (Nagasaki bugyō between 1702–11).\(^74\)

This trend of Chinese physicians going or being taken to Japan continued throughout the early and mid-eighteenth century. This has to be seen in direct relation with Tokugawa Yoshimune’s 徳川吉宗 (1684–1751) policy, proclaimed in 1718 (kyōhō 3), to order ship captains to bring good Chinese physicians to Japan.\(^75\) Two Chinese shipmasters, Li Shengxian 李蕂先 and Zhong Shengyu 鍾聖玉, who enjoyed a good reputation and had both been awarded additional trading licenses at the time when the number of licenses was adjusted in 1717 (kyōhō 2), received this order. In 1719, Li Shengxian brought Wu Dainan 吳戴南, a doctor from Suzhou, to Nagasaki. But Wu Dainan, being fifty-six years old, soon became ill and died. In 1721 (kyōhō 6), a

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\(^69\) Cf. the analysis of Chinese and Japanese documents in Wang Su, „Sino-Japanische Beziehungen im Bereich der Medizin: Der Fall des Xu Zhilin 徐之道 (c. 1599–1678)“, pp. 185–234.

\(^70\) Tsūkō ichiran, vol. 5, j. 223, p. 561.


\(^74\) Xu Shihong, Jianghu shidai RiZhong mihuа (1997), p. 133.

physician from Suzhou, Chen Zhenxian (1681–1755), and a doctor from Ningbo, Zhu Laizhang, went to Japan, and in 1725 (kyōhō 10), Zhou Qilai 周岐來 from Suzhou followed. Chen Zhenxian was the author of the Caiyao lu 採藥錄 (1721), a copy of which is also included in the ZSSXDJ. Although many more doctors could be mentioned, I will, however, concentrate on the Zhu brothers and Zhou Qilai.

Zhu Peizhang is described as a Confucian scholar and together with Zhu Lai-zhang was treated as a doctor. Because he was ordered by Tokugawa Yoshimune to bring persons skilled in archery and equine knowledge to Japan, he will be dealt with in more detail in the next sub-chapter. Laizhang, who is described as the “most vivid of the three Zhu brothers” by Ōba Osamu, came to Nagasaki on the 16th day of the 7th month 1721 (kyōhō 6) on board a Guangdong ship belonging to the shipmaster Wu Kexiu 吳克修. He was accompanied by his servants Shen Shiyi 沈士義, Derong 德榮, and Aqing 阿慶, and from the 16th day of the 9th month they all lived at the residence of the chief interpreter (da tongshi 大通事) Sakaki Tōjiemon 彭城藤治衛門. There, Laizhang carried out medical examinations of local citizens. On the 20th day of the 12th month 1723 (kyōhō 8), he went to the Chinese Compound, the Tōjin yashiki. The following day, he boarded a Ningbo vessel belonging to the shipmaster Zheng Dadian 鄭大典 to return home. In reward for his accomplishments as a doctor, his nephew, Zhu Yunguang 朱允光, was awarded a temporary Ningbo trading licence for 1724, which allowed him to return to Japan with Zhu Yunguang and his elder brothers, Peizhang and Zizhang, as well as Peizhang’s son, Yunchuan 允傳, their relative, Zhu Shuangyu 朱雙玉, and the servants Derong, Aren 阿任, Agui 阿貴, Xinggui 興貴, and Ayuan 阿元 on board. They reached Nagasaki on the 5th day of the 2nd month of 1725 (kyōhō 10) and were permitted to reside at the home of Kanbai Sanjūrō 官梅三十郎. At that time, according to Ōba Osamu, Zhu Peizhang was sixty-four, Zizhang fifty-three, and Laizhang forty-seven.


77 Ōba Osamu, for example, still mentions Chen Xingde 陳行德, who was brought to Japan by the shipmaster Guo Xiangtong 郭享統 in 1722.

78 *Tsūkō ichiran*, vol. 5, j. 216, p. 458.

79 Cf. Also *Tsūkō ichiran*, vol. 5, j. 216, pp. 458 and 459.

80 ZSSXDJ, p. 706.

81 *Tsūkō ichiran*, vol. 5, j. 216, p. 458.


During this second stay in Japan, Laizhang replied to questions from Kurimoto Zuiken 栗本瑞見, a noted zoologist of Japan. These were recorded in a manuscript known as Zhu Laizhang zhiyan 朱来章治驗 (Jap. Shu Raishō chiken) and kept by the Naikaku bunko 内閣文庫. During this period, he also wrote the Zhou Zhu fuyan 周朱復言 (Zhou-Zhu exchange) together with another physician, Zhou Qilai 周歧興. This text is a discussion by both physicians of medical problems, and still awaits a thorough investigation.

On this second voyage to Japan, Laizhang presented five items as gifts to the Shōgun: the Yueshu 樂書 (Book on music), a work in six cases, a tablet with a poem (shipai yì xiāng 詩牌一箱) in a box, a scroll mapping the Yangzi River, a pair of coral branches in a box and two silver-grey, pelt-covered palanquin cushions. In addition, he brought with him a large quantity of books which he intended to sell in Nagasaki. These will be briefly introduced below. Apparently, in 1726 (kyōhō 11), on the 13th day of the 5th month, Laizhang returned home on board a Guangdong vessel. His second brother, Zhu Zizhang, was also a doctor. He is said to have explained the method of treating smallpox to Manao Shun’an 間野春庵 and Yanagi Jotaku 柳如澤 and also replied to questions from Imaōji Chika’aki 今大路親顯 and Kurimoto Zuiken. Ōba Osamu also mentions two works from the Kenkensai bunko 乾々齋文庫, the Shu Shishō tō Ujita Un’an 朱子章答宇多田雲庵 (Zhu Zizhang replies to Ujita Un’an) and the Shu Shishō mondō 朱子章問答 (Questions and answers of Zhu Zizhang). Ujita Un’an was a doctor who received permission to put queries to Zhu Zizhang. Zizhang later became ill and eventually died in Japan in 1726 (kyōhō 11).

The doctor Zhou Qilai helped to publish a paediatric text from the Ming dynasty entitled Youke zhezhong 幼科折衷 (Different views on paediatrics) by Qin Changyu 秦昌遇, which was held by Yuge Kiyotane 弓削清胤, a Confucian scholar from Kumamoto 熊本. In the winter of 1725 (kyōhō 10), Zhou Qilai wrote a bibliographic note on this text, the Zhezhong yuanliu 折衷源流 (Origins of the [Youke] zhezhong),

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84 The text is reproduced in ZSSXDJ, pp. 639–644.
85 Part of their mutual discussion is included in the ZSSXDJ, pp. 661–665.
86 ZSSXDJ, p. 706.
87 ZSSXDJ, p. 711; see also Tsūkō ichiran, vol. 5, j. 216, p. 459.
and in 1726 (kyōhō 11) a preface to the work. These two texts by Zhou Qilai were then added to the original work and published in the 7th month of 1727 by the Kumamoto domain. In 1726, Zhou’s younger brother, Zhou Qixing 周岐興, travelled to Japan on board the ship of a certain Lu Nanpo 陸南坡. He was permitted to leave the Chinese Compound and reside at the residence of Yanagi 柳 on the pretext that he assisted in the preparation of drugs. Zhou Qilai returned to China in 1727 and travelled back to Japan in the winter of 1731. His brother, too, went home and then returned.

Exchanges in the field of medicine in particular attest to the vivid interest by the Japanese in Chinese medical knowledge. The examples of the Zhu brothers and their colleagues provide firm evidence for the fact that this kind of exchange was maintained and continued into the late kangxi and yongzheng reign periods, despite other frictions in Sino-Japanese relations.

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92 “Youke zhezhong xu 幼科折衷序”, in ZSSXDJ, pp. 665–666.
HORSES, ARCHERS, AND VETERINARIANS

Chinese veterinarian knowledge and equestrian skills were highly valued in Japan at that time, but Qing law actually prohibited the private export of horses overseas.95 Nevertheless, there were quite a number of instances of horses being privately shipped to Japan.96 In 1718 (kyōhō 3), Tokugawa Yoshimune explicitly required Chinese horse equipment and three Chinese horses.97 In 1719, a certain Yi Fujiu 伊孚九, younger brother of Yi Daoji 伊韜吉, used the trade permission of his elder brother to secretly ship horses to Japan. Horses were also gathered on the Zhoushan 舟山 archipelago to be shipped to Japan.98 Zhu Peizhang, too, was involved in getting horse specialists to Japan.99 Tokugawa Yoshimune wanted to get men from China who were skilled in equestrian archery, as well as the breeding and medical treatment of horses (you qima yangma liaoma zhi ren, ze qi shan zhe daitong qianlai yi bei 有騎馬養馬療馬之人擇其善者帶同前來以備). Zhu Peizhang also possessed some military experience and was regarded as qualified to select skilled persons. Following this order, in 1725 (kyōhō 10), he asked for a trading license to be granted to his son, Zhu Yunchuan 朱允傳, who subsequently received a temporary trading licence.100 In the 2nd month of 1726 (kyōhō 11), Peizhang handed in a second petition. As he had a horse specialist from Guangdong in mind, he asked for a licence for a ship from Guangdong, a request which was also granted.101

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95 Wang Zhichun 王之春 (b. 1842) (author), Zhao Chunzhen 趙春震 (comment.), Qingchao Rouyuan ji 清朝柔遠記. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000), j. 4, p. 72 and 76; see also Qinding Da Qing huidian zeli 欽定大清會典則例 (1764). Guangxu-ed. (1899), j. 119, pp. 23a–b (560), in Siku quanshu, fasc. 620–625, and Qingshi gao 清史稿 by Zhao Erxun 趙爾巽 (1844–1927) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976), j. 141, p. 4175, for prohibitions on the private sale of horses, especially of Mongolian horses.

96 I investigated these questions in more depth in “Horses in late Imperial China and Maritime East Asia: An Introduction into Trade, Distribution, and other Aspects (c. sixteenth to eighteenth centuries)”, in Bert Fragner, Ralph Kauz, Roderich Ptak, Angela Schottenhammer (eds.), Pferde in Asien: Geschichte, Handel und Kultur/Horses in Asia: History, Trade and Culture (Wien: Publikationen der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2008), c. 35 pages (forthcoming). The following paragraphs will thus only provide a brief insight into the import of horses, archers, and veterinarians from China to Japan.


100 Zhu Peizhang, “Seikai onshi shinpai bun 請開恩賜信牌文 (kyōhō 10, 11th month, i.e. 1725), in ZSSXDJ, pp. 647–648, p. 647.

month of 1726, he recommended a certain Shen Dacheng 沈大成\textsuperscript{102} as skilled in archery, martial arts and horsemanship, who was supposed to accompany him to Nagasaki on the same ship. But because it would raise the suspicion of villains and rowdies if somebody skilled in martial arts was on board, it was decided that Shen Dacheng should travel with another ship.\textsuperscript{103} A passage in the *Karauma norikata ho’i* 唐馬乘方補遺 (Supplement on Chinese Horse Riding) provides further information:

“Zhu Peizhang attempted to bring with him (to Japan) in the same vessel a man learned in riding and raising horses by the name of Shen Dacheng. But because *it was forbidden to leave the country with someone capable in martial arts* (my emphasis), numerous rumours began to circulate, and they postponed their departure. Zhu Peizhang left (China) first by himself and Shen Dacheng agreed to follow him on a subsequent vessel. The latter became further and further delayed, and Zhu Peizhang was eventually ordered (by the Japanese authorities) to return home alone. His younger brother Zhu Laizhang was worried about him. Shen Dacheng was not the only man skilled in archery and horses; there were in fact men even more talented than he was. He selected Chen Cairuo 陳采若 and escorted him together with the equine doctor Liu Jingxian on a vessel number twenty in the year of the sheep (1727) under the shipmaster Zhong Jintian 種覲天. Both came (to Japan) on this ship.\textsuperscript{104} Zhu Peizhang had written letters to a man named Chen Liangxuan 陳良選 in which he requested the transport of Shen Dacheng to Japan, and these letters were so numerous that Chen Liangxuan could not remain silent. But because of the numerous rumours around him, Chen remained in hiding to people on board the ship and even to Zhu Laizhang. Changing his own name to Chen Dacheng 陳大成, he eventually sailed (to Japan) as assistant shipmaster for vessel number twenty-two.”\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{102} His life span is not clear. He is most probably not the Qing scholar Shen Dacheng 沈大成 (who lived from 1700–1771 according to a biography [xingzhuang 行状] composed by Wang Dajing 王大經) mentioned in the *Qingdai renwu shengzu nianbiao* 清代人物生卒年表 edited by Jiang Qingbo 江慶柏 (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2005), p. 359. Another Shen Dacheng 沈大成 lived much later, from 1762 to 1799, and is, for example, referred to in the *Qingdai beizhuan wentong jian* 清代碑傳文通檢 edited by Chen Naiqian 陳乃乾 (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2003), p. 106.

\textsuperscript{103} Zhu Peizhang, “Shu Haishō gosei no bai meshitsure mōsāzaru okotowari no kakitsuke 朱佩章御請之馬醫召連不申御斷之書付”, in *Tsūkō ichiran*, vol. 5, j. 216, p. 467; also *ZSSXDJ*, p. 679.

\textsuperscript{104} In 1727 (21\textsuperscript{st} day of the 6\textsuperscript{th} month), the horse specialist named Shen Dacheng 沈大成, the archer Chen Cairuo, and the horse doctor Liu Jingxian 劉經先 reached Nagasaki. Cf. *Tsūkō ichiran*, vol. 5, j. 216, p. 459.

\textsuperscript{105} *Karauma norikata ho’i* 唐馬乘方補遺 (Supplement on Chinese Horse Riding), in *ZSSXDJ*, pp. 289–360, here pp. 352–353.
The ZSSXDJ is a gold mine concerning veterinarian and other texts related to horses and horsemanship. In addition to the *Karauma norikata ho’i*, the *Karauma norikata kikigaki* 唐馬乘方聞書 (*Verbatim notes on Chinese horse riding*) \(^{106}\), the *Bai Tōjin ryōjihō kakitsuke* 马醫唐人療治方書付 (*Notes on the healing methods of Chinese equine medicine*) by Chen Cairuo and Shen Dacheng \(^{107}\), and the *Taigo ki roku* 對語驥録 (*Record of a conversation on thoroughbred horses*) by Chen Cairuo et al., are included in this volume. \(^{108}\) These texts on equine medicine and the conversations of Japanese with Chinese specialists on topics like horse riding and breeding etc. attest to the importance attached in Japan to the proper treatment of horses. And they provide evidence that the Japanese, especially Tokugawa Yoshimune, although proud of their own equine tradition, considered knowledge from China, namely from the Manchus (who ruled China at that time) with their nomadic background and profound knowledge on the correct breeding and treatment of horses, as superior to their own tradition. Otherwise, the smuggling of horses and texts related to questions of equine medicine and horsemanship would be hard to explain.

On the Chinese side, according to a report by the governor-general of Zhejiang, Li Wei 李衛 (1687?–1738) \(^{109}\), thirty-three smugglers were caught during the four months from September to December 1728. They were smuggling bows, doctors, monks and maps. The *Qingchao Rouyuan ji* 清朝柔遠記 provides us with the information that, in yongzheng 6 (1728), the maritime merchants Zhong Jintian 種覲天 and Shen Shunchang 沈順昌 possessed Japanese trade certificates. Zhong repeatedly took the Military Selectee, Zhang Canruo 張澯若 from Hangcheng 杭城, to Japan as an archery trainer. With these transactions, he made a few thousand silver ingots (*de yin shuqian* 得銀数千) annually. Apparently, his case could also be brought to light through the inquiries of Zhu Laizhang and Yu Xiaoxing, who were sent to Japan as “spies”, as we will see below. \(^{110}\) Once, Shen Shunchang not only took archery to Japan but also a veterinary

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\(^{106}\) ZSSXDJ, pp. 233–287.

\(^{107}\) ZSSXDJ, pp. 155–231.

\(^{108}\) ZSSXDJ, pp. 363–377. On the 29\(^{th}\) day of the 6\(^{th}\) month 1727, the Nagasaki Magistrate (*bugyō*) ordered the interpreters from Sakaki Tōjiemon 彩城藤治右衞門 on downwards to take care of Chen Cairuo, Shen Dacheng and Liu Jingxuan. Consequently, on the 10\(^{th}\) day of the 7\(^{th}\) month they were allowed to live in the Finance Building at Sakurababa 櫻馬場 in Nagasaki together with three servants – Yu Tiancheng 俞天成, Guo Dawei 郭大爲 and Li Yaqing 李亞慶. They were allowed to move about relatively freely, could visit temples and go sightseeing in the city. The same month Tomita Matazaemon 富田又左衞門 paid them a visit from Edo and subsequently asked them all manner of questions concerning horses. The result was the *Taigo ki roku*.


\(^{110}\) *Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi* 世宗憲皇帝硃批諭旨, j. 174, section 9, pp. 6b–7a, in *Siku quanshu*, fasc. 423.
doctor from Suzhou, named Song 宋, who could treat horses. 111 A certain Guo Yuguan 郭裕觀 from Xiamen smuggled a monk and a horse to Japan. 112 Consequently, at least from time to time, horses, archery equipment, veterinary knowledge (in this case a horse doctor) as well as knowledge in archery were secretly “exported” to Japan. Horses, as a rule, together with maps, military equipment, books on law and statecraft, belonged to the category of commodities prohibited from being taken across the border. 113 One older Company Commander (qianzong 千總) with long hair from Guangdong, it is claimed, even received several thousand gold pieces annually from the Japanese for constructing more than two hundred warships (dingzao zhanchuan erbai yu hao 錠造戰船二百餘號) and training sailors. 114 Because of all these smuggling activities, Emperor Kangxi eventually only permitted merchants of the Imperial Household Department (neishang 内商) to conduct trade in the Eastern Ocean (Dongyang maoyi). 115 Rumours circulated that the Japanese “enticed worthless Chinese merchant fellows to teach them mechanical (and military?) skills” (fengwen Riben gyouyou Zhongguo wulai shangmin wang bi jiaoxi jiyi 風聞日本勾誘中國無頼商民往彼教習技藝), whereupon merchant vessels were temporarily strictly prohibited from sailing abroad. 116

**BOOKS**

Books were some of the most desired objects of trade in Northeast Asia, and restrictions were imposed not only by the Chinese on their export but also by the Japanese on their import into Japan. 117 The Japanese were afraid that books containing Christian ideas and theology could be smuggled from China into Japan. At that time, the Kangxi Emperor


112 *Qingchao Rouyuan ji, j*. 4, p. 76. See also *Tsūkō ichiran*, *j*. 216, p. 500.

113 *Qingchao Rouyuan ji, j*. 4, pp. 72–76.

114 Ibid. p. 72.

115 Ibid. p. 72.

116 Ibid. p. 74.

117 On the export prohibition of Chinese historical writings to her neighbours, cf. Erhard Rosner, “Zum Verbot der Weitergabe chinesischer Geschichtswerke an die Barbaren”, in Wolfgang Bauer (Hrsg.), *Studia Sino-Mongolica. Festschrift für Herbert Franke*. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979), pp. 89–96. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, foreigners, especially tribute envoys, were forbidden to take Chinese historical works across China’s borders. As Rosner notes, this prohibition was partly based on a growing xenophobia and a policy of isolation. In addition, as these works were considered manuals of diplomacy and of the art of war, it was thought dangerous to have them fall into the hands of enemies. The Chinese were also convinced that a correct interpretation of history required a particular moral attitude, which the barbarians did not have (p. 96).
offered Jesuits great liberties: consequently, the Japanese suspected that the Chinese
and even their Tartar emperor himself were followers of Jesuit teachings.\footnote{Engelbert Kaempfer, \textit{Geschichte und Beschreibung von Japan} (1964), p. 123.}

According to the \textit{Qingchao Rouyuan ji}, when Zhu Laizhang was questioned by a local
official in the 11\textsuperscript{th} month of 1728 (see below), it came to light that he had once taken
500 books to Japan.\footnote{\textit{Qingchao rouyuan ji}, p. 76.} As already mentioned above, we know that Zhu Lai-zhang on his
second trip to Japan in 1725 also brought a great quantity of books with him.
Fortunately, a list of the books is preserved in the \textit{Hakusai shomoku} 船載書目 (\textit{List of
books brought as cargo}) held by the Archives and Mausoleum Department of the
Imperial Household Agency in Japan and reprinted in the \textit{ZSSXDJ}.\footnote{\textit{Hakusai shomoku}, in \textit{ZSSXDJ}, pp. 707–709.}

Also a doctor named Zhao Songyang 趙淞陽 brought books to Japan. He reached
Nagasaki on the Nanjing ship of a certain Gao Lingwen 高令聞 on the 9\textsuperscript{th} day of the 1\textsuperscript{st}
month, 1736 (kyōhō 21). Together with Gao Fuhuang 高輔皇, Wu Sulai 吳宿来, and his
servant, Xu’an 徐安, they resided at the house of Kawama Yaheiji 河間八平次.
Apparently, Zhao was already sixty-three years old by then, and he certainly examined
patients in the private residence where he lived.\footnote{Xu Shihong, \textit{Jianghu shidai RiZhong mihua} (1997), pp. 135–136.} The \textit{Hakusai shomoku} has a list of
texts “brought by the Chinese doctor [Zhao] Song-yang”, in all twenty-one works of
medical content.\footnote{Xu Shihong, \textit{Jianghu shidai RiZhong mihua} (1997), p. 136.} Also the list of books by Zhu Laizhang (see appendix) can attest to
the importance of works with medical content, in all fifteen, two of them being on horse
medicine, out of seventy-six titles.

Books of medical (thirteen titles), botanical (one title), and veterinarian (two titles)
content were not the only books of interest to the Japanese. An analysis of Zhu’s list of
books shows that they were also interested in literary works in the broader sense (fifteen
titles), dictionaries (five titles), classical writings (six titles), general history (five titles)
or writings on statecraft (four titles), Buddhist sutras (three titles), two works on the
Chinese calendar (including a recent edition of the \textit{Shixian} calendar 時憲曆 produced
by a Jesuit missionary), but above all books on geography and local administration
(seventeen titles), in particular local gazetteers (\textit{difangzhi}, fifteen titles).

We know that Yoshimune was especially keen to acquire local gazetteers prepared
under the Qing dynasty after the reunification of China in 1644. Most probably, Zhu
Laizhang had therefore tried to obtain the most recent editions. Yoshimune was
interested in Qing government politics, particularly the accomplishment of the \textit{kangxi}
reign, and generally encouraged what we might call “practical learning” (\textit{jitsugaku} 實
It has been argued that his interest in *difangzhi* has to be traced back to the fact that in 1719, he ordered the production of comprehensive Japanese maps and wanted to compile Japanese *difangzhi* for which the Chinese texts could serve as examples or reference works. However, Ōba Osamu is of the opinion that Yoshimune was particularly interested in the category of “local products” (*tuchan* 土産), as “excerpts made from Chinese *difangzhi* by scholars of the Edo period reveal that always the text passages on local products were selected”, while he may have sought to use Chinese texts as references for the local administration in Japan. Ōba’s research further showed that most of the local gazetteers taken to Japan were actually those of the Jiangnan region, which should not be surprising as this was not only one of the most developed areas of China but the centre of publication and also the region from which most ships departed to Japan, with Ningbo as the main port of entry in Sino-Japanese trade. The book list of Zhu Laizhang may additionally serve as evidence that *difangzhi* from other regions of China, such as Sichuan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hunan, Hubei, and even Yunnan, also reached Japan.

Details on China’s government and administration were of general interest to the Japanese rulers. The aforementioned Fukami Kudayū was ordered to translate the *Da Qing huidian* 大清會典 (*Collected Statutes of the Great Qing Dynasty*) into Japanese by the Shōgun Yoshimune. For this purpose Fukami Kudayū travelled to Nagasaki, where he spent five years. The Chinese person who advised Fukami on difficult terms in the *Da Qing huidian*, as Ōba Osamu discovered, was a certain Sun Fuzhai 孫輔斋.

Sun Fuzhai was also the person who brought a copy of illustrations from the *Gujin tushu jicheng huitu* 古今圖書集成繪圖 (*Collection of books past and present*) to Japan:

> “The Chinese merchant Sun Fuzhai selected illustrations from the *Gujin tushu jicheng*, in total more than 160 volumes, which he brought to Nagasaki. He said that it was a rare book which should fetch a high price. The local Magistrate compelled him to go to Edo to get it accepted there.

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126 He was the son of Fukami Gentai 深見玄岱 and a third generation Japanese of Chinese origin.

He was ordered to get the whole book (in China), not just the illustrations.”

Thereupon, Sun Fuzhai told the shogunate administrator, Hosoi Yasuaki (細井安明) (Nagasaki, between 1729–36), that up to the present only the illustrations had been published and the text was not yet available. Hosoi took this for the truth and forwarded the information. But Tokugawa Yoshimune, who in particular sought to retrieve ancient lost Chinese and Japanese books, had already noted in an introduction written by the Yongzheng Emperor that “the printing had been completed”. Apparently, Sun Fuzhai eventually brought a complete edition to Japan.

As for the category of literature and poetry, besides classical Confucian writings Tang authors in particular seemed to have interested the Japanese. In the *Hakusai shomoku* held by the Archives and Mausoleum Department of the Imperial Household Agency the *Gujin tushu jicheng huitu* is listed for 1736 (*kyōhō* 21). It is followed by entries on the *Tang santi shi* (Poems in three styles from the Tang dynasty) by Zhou Bi (twelfth/thirteenth century) and the *Xu Tang santi shi* (Quih tui shi, Continuation of poems in three styles from the Tang dynasty) by Gao Shiqi (1645–1704). Also four other works, said to be brought by the renowned Chinese scholar Shen Xiean, are mentioned: the *Bianzhu* (Classified pearls), originally by Du Gongzhan (杜公瞻, seventh century); the *Wenxian tongkao zuan* (Revised edition of the Comprehensive investigation of institutions), originally by Ma Duanlin (1254–1323); the *Tangshi jingbi* (The azure whale of Tang poetry) (1707) by Shao Renhong (邵仁泓), and the *Da Qing lüli zhushu guanghui quanshu* (Expanded and complete edition of the Legal code of the Great Qing Dynasty with vermilion annotations).

In addition, Yoshimune ordered Ogyū Sōshichirō, who had also questioned Zhu Peizhang, as we have seen above, to prepare an edition of the *Tang lü shuyi* (Commentary on the Tang legal code), a task which Ogyū completed in 1725. According to his report, he corrected 3,142 incorrect characters, added 496, omitted and cut 171 superfluous characters, and changed seventy-nine characters which had been used out of proper context. In addition, he compared Tang with Ming law as well as with Japan’s own legal codex which to a great extent was based on the original Tang codex. Ogyū’s revision was later shown to Shen Xiean who was permitted to copy a

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129 Such a thorough comparison of editions with original sources was obviously not an exception. In an epilogue to a Japanese edition of the *Yishu daquan* (醫書大全), Gen’un Jukei (Gen’un Jukei, 幻雲壽桂) noted that three typos had been discovered and everything had been carefully compared with original sources in order to get as close to the original as possible. Cf. Wang Su, „Sino-Japanische Beziehungen im Bereich der Medizin: Der Fall des Xu Zhilin (徐之遴) (c. 1599–1678)“, pp. 191–192.
part of it and take it back to China. When Shen returned to Japan in 1736 he brought with him a preface to the *Tanglù shuyi* by the Chinese prime minister, Li Tingyi (1669–1732), which he presented to the Japanese authorities. This preface is kept by the Archives and Mausolea Department of the Imperial Household Agency. In 1806 (*bunka* 3), Li Tingyi’s preface was placed in front of the text and the Bakufu published an official edition of the *Tanglù shuyi*.

All this may serve as evidence of the inter-cultural exchange between China and Japan, and the Japanese interest in writings on Chinese literature and statecraft. In the late eighteenth century, Nakagawa Tadateru 中川忠英 (1753–1830) composed his *Shinzoku kibun* 清俗紀聞 (*Manual on what has been recorded and heard about Qing customs; 1799*), meant as a guide for Japanese travelling to China, providing a vivid insight into how a Japanese traveller perceived China and her customs in the late eighteenth century.

**INTERIM CONCLUSION**

To draw a first conclusion: it has become evident that in Japan an active interest in Chinese knowledge, particularly in the fields of medicine and natural sciences in general, horsemanship, statecraft writing and local administration, i.e. a wide range of knowledge which we may call “practical” and scientific learning, remained throughout the *kangxi* and *yongzheng* reigns. We should also not forget that the importation of knowledge and goods from China was to a great extent a state sponsored enterprise. The first Tokugawa *Shōgun*, Ieyasu (r. 1603–1616), had already displayed a very positive attitude towards foreign trade. As we have noted, Tokugawa Yoshimune (r. 1716–1745) in particular was very interested in Chinese goods and ideas. But at the same time, Japan’s rulers wanted to set up and maintain stricter control over their maritime relations. Under Iemitsu 家光 (r. 1623–1651) the seclusion acts (*sakoku* 鎖國) were promulgated, which more or less officially secluded Japan from intercourse with Western countries, except the Dutch, but not with East Asian countries. Concerning Japan’s intercourse with Western cultures, the example of “Dutch learning” (*Rangaku*) may show that the rulers were still interested in practical and scientific knowledge, regardless of the fact that it came from the West, as long as it was not “contaminated” by Christian views. Tokugawa Tsunayoshi 徳川綱吉 (r. 1690–1709) sought to control the import of luxury items, which were exchanged for gold, silver and copper, and he intended to restructure Japan’s overseas relations. Japanese rulers increasingly sought to strengthen domestic production and especially to restrict the permanent outflow of metals from Japan. Yoshimune eventually launched the so-called *Kyōhō reforms* 享保改革 (1716–1736) to make the country economically stronger and financially more solvent by attempting to increase the use of commercial capital in the domestic economy. Thus, control, seclusion, and restrictions ran parallel with the exchange of knowledge and goods with China. The Japanese rulers increasingly intended to decide for themselves in

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what ways and to what extent this exchange took place, and perhaps to a greater extent than ever before, they placed the supra-ordinate goal of strengthening their country politically and economically over “private” interests of the ruling élite. In this respect, it would be incorrect to consider Japan’s search for control of the China trade and exchange as a negative reference towards China. China with her knowledge, goods and ideas continued to be welcome, under conditions which in the long term would “enrich” the Japanese state in terms of desired commodities, economic profit and scientific knowledge. Japan’s “restrictions” of the China trade were thus of a conditional and limited nature, and trade relations, both official and unofficial, remained rather vibrant. Let us now see how the Chinese reacted to Japan’s new regulations of this trade.

**CHINA’S REACTION TO JAPAN’S NEW POLICY**

The copper shortage in China and the decreasing copper imports from Japan, worsened by the Shōtoku export restrictions as well as problems with the supply of export copper, were a setback to the Chinese and eventually prompted the Chinese government to react. But before we investigate this reaction to Japan’s new policy in more detail, we will first have to comment on the importance of copper in China, as the government’s measures will otherwise remain quite incomprehensible.

Since the sixteenth century, silver had already begun to play an ever more important role as a monetary metal. Due to the flourishing maritime trade from the sixteenth century onwards in the coastal regions and larger cities, economic conditions developed which were increasingly orientated towards exchange, towards the market economy from taxation to everyday markets. But in the beginning, it was primarily the rich households and merchants who profited from the excellent business opportunities overseas. Their money was unminted silver taels (liang). Foreigners paid in silver for Chinese commodities, from porcelains and silks to medical drugs, tea, and other products. Already in the course of the late Ming the importance of silver as money, as equivalent of value, means of circulation and means of payment, increased. With the discovery of new silver mines in Japan in the early seventeenth century, Japan became the major source of silver for China. In order to satisfy state and private demand for silver, Chinese merchants continued to import great quantities of silver from abroad throughout the mid-seventeenth century, above all from Japan. Recent estimates have even shown that silver continued to flow into China despite the trade ban under Kangxi from 1662–83. 132 On the other hand, the early Qing state needed much silver. During the military campaigns of the kangxi reign, great quantities of silver were required, which dried up the silver reserves in the state coffers. But by the end of the seventeenth century, the state silver reserves had gradually recovered.133

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133 This has been shown by Kishimoto Mio, Shindai Chūgoku no bukka to keizai hendō, Tokyō: Kenbun shuppan, 1997, pp. 490–492; also Kishimoto-Nakayama Mio, “The Kangxi Depression and Early Qing Local Markets”, Modern China, 10:2 (1984), pp. 234–235.
Around the turn of the century, the Kangxi Emperor, as we have seen above, was surprised as to why there was suddenly so little silver being imported from Japan by that time, and he eventually sent a “spy”, Morsen, to Japan. Kangxi wanted more silver, but at the same time we cannot say that his country was really dependent on this silver. Firstly, the basis of China’s economy continued to be orientated towards self-subsistence (although money and market exchange relations had become a definite part of the economy), and, secondly, the state coffers had again been filled by that time. This may explain why the emperor was satisfied with Morsen’s report and did not undertake any further measures, although the silver import quotas sank even further.

Morsen’s report and Kangxi’s passive policy towards Japan were quite critically appraised by the Yongzheng Emperor, as we have seen in the introduction. But it was not simply a question of perception or attitude. By the yongzheng reign, the economic situation in China had changed too.

Copper imports from Japan, as a rule designated as “yangtong 洋銅”, literally meaning “overseas copper” were already more important by then. The increasing demand for copper in 1699 had already induced the Kangxi Emperor to promote maritime trade with Japan in order to purchase Japanese copper. Generally speaking, between 1684 and 1723 China was more or less completely relying on Japanese copper, a situation which only changed with the reformation of the system in the early qianlong reign and the increasing use of copper from Yunnan. With regard to copper imports from Japan, the extent of smuggling as well as imports via third countries is of course difficult to assess, rising copper prices contributing decisively to a flow of the metal in certain directions. But we already possess quite well-researched figures of China’s copper

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134 Sometimes, however, the sources also speak of “red copper” (hongtong 紅銅). As Wang Qing has shown, Japanese hongtong was imported into China by the Ryūkyūans as a tribute item and the copper was then used for architectural projects or the casting of containers for the Qing imperial palace. See Wang Qing, “Changes in the Composition of Ryūkyū’s Tribute to Qing Period China – Historical and Economic Aspects”, in Angela Schottenhammer (ed.), *The East Asian “Mediterranean”* (2008), pp. 219–234. But the use of the term “hongtong” is misleading. According to Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 5, part II. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 178, “hongtong” refers to nickel arsenide (Kupfernickel), NiAs, which means that its composition did not contain copper, but only looked like copper. Speaking of Japanese copper, if not using the term “yangtong”, we should therefore rather uniformly use the Japanese expression of “shakudō 赤銅” (red copper, “shaku” being another word for “red”, but referring to a light reddish or violet and not a deep red colour), which consisted of about 95% copper, 1% silver and 1 to 5 % gold. Before a suitable treatment of its surface, the Japanese shakudō had a dark copper colour, but “when completely pickled it acquires a rich black surface with a violet sheen”. Cf. to Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 5, part II (1974), p. 264.

135 In 1741 (qianlong 6), for example, the Investigating Censor (jiancha yushi 監察御史) of Guizhou 貴州, Sun Hao 孫灝 (1700–1766), noted that Japanese copper was used for casting people’s utensils (鋼之為用在官則供鼓鑄, 在民則供器用, 今鼓鑄之鋼盡求之滇, 器用取給洋銅). Cf. *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu* 高宗純皇帝實録, j. 155, p. 1a (1431).

imports from Japan, by analyzing Chinese, Japanese, and Dutch sources. We also know that during the time period under investigation here, copper imports by Western merchants like the Dutch obviously remained low.

What had changed, or why did China suddenly need so much copper? By the seventeenth century, income in the form of money had become a necessary part of the domestic peasant and handicrafts economy. It was needed either to supplement the household economy or as a medium to pay taxes. In contrast to earlier dynasties, Qing local markets were rather open and independent of each other. Silk and cotton fabrics from Jiangnan or rice from Hunan were sold empire-wide and local specialities from one region were sold on distant markets elsewhere. Local markets growing along with the rising population generally required value denominations for market exchange much smaller than silver taels (liang = 37.3 g), which were not coined and thus simply not suitable for daily markets and small commodity circulation. The Qing sought to maintain a stable value of bronze coins at 1,000 coins for one tael of silver and, thus, strictly controlled the issue of high quality bronze coins. The promotion of bronze coinage, I argue, has consequently to be seen in direct relationship to the expanding local markets which required a solid means of circulation for smaller trade and exchange activities.


138 Ryuto Shimada (Appendix 5, pp. 200–203, p. 203) provides an overview on Japanese copper imported into China by the VOC. Accordingly the recorded imports were negligible until the mid-eighteenth century: 1748/49: 15,000; 1763/64: 6,250; 1764/65: 250,000; 1765/66: 450,000. Cf. Ryuto Shimada, The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Comapny during the Eighteenth Century. (Leiden, Boston: E. J. Brill, 2006). TANAP Monographs on the History of Asian-European Interaction, 4. The direct VOC trade with the Chinese Qing Empire via Canton began in 1729. There had been no trade in the 1710s. The reasons for that, as Leonard Blussé has shown, were, first that prior to 1729 the China trade of Batavia had been mainly taken care of by Chinese junks. Secondly, a trade embargo had been installed by the Chinese court. Cf. Leonard Blussé, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: Foris, 1986), Chapter 6; Leonard Blussé, “No Boats to China: The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635–1690”, Modern Asian Studies, 30:1 (1996), pp. 51–76. In the 1770, the VOC imported commodities valued at 1,362,600 guilders into China. The most important commodity was silver cash, corresponding to more than 50% of the total import value. But China was also interested in other commodities such as tin and pepper from Southeast Asia.

139 For a detailed discussion of this argument see also Angela Schottenhammer, “Chūgoku keizaishi no kenkyū ni okeru kahei to kahei seisaku: futatsu no jirei to sore ni kansuru kenkai 中国経済史の研究における貨幣と貨幣政策: 二つの事例とそれに関する見解”, in Ihara Hiroshi 伊原弘 (ed.), Sōsen no sekai 宋銭の世界. (Tōkyō: Bensei shuppansha, 2008), c. 25 pages (in print); Angela Schottenhammer, “The Sino-Japanese Copper Trade during the Early and High Qing period, until c. 1800”, c. 40 pages (unpublished manuscript).
But the government was confronted with several difficulties, such as scarcity of raw copper and the proliferation of counterfeit coins. The promotion of copper imports was consequently a logical step, and copper merchants (tongshang 銅商) thus received extensive support from the Qing government.\footnote{Already in 1699, the import and trade of copper had been transferred to merchants authorized by the Imperial Household Department (neiwufu) who acted as magnate contractors and had to gain stricter control over funds of public origin. \textit{Huangchao wenxian tongkao} by Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 (1672–1755) et al. (comp), j. 14, p. 26a, p. 35a; Fu Yiling 傳衣凌, \textit{Ming Qing shidai shangren ji shangye ziben} 明清時代商人及商業資本. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1956), pp. 178–179; Fu Yiling also notes that the origin of the Qing copper merchants as well as their support by the government can be traced back to late Ming times.} The \textit{Huangchao wenxian tongkao} for example states:

“The country (Japan) is rich in copper. What our dynasty is relying on for the melting of metals, is, in addition to copper from Yunnan (Diantong 滇銅), the purchase of copper from Japan (yangtong 洋銅). The provinces of Anqing (in Anhui), Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang annually procure a quota of more than 4,430,000 jin. The merchants who are responsible for the procurement of copper have to be registered and equipped with a Japanese trading certificate (WoZhao) as proof. In addition, there is an extra quota, for which they are provided with small permits (XiaoZhao 小照) but only for 100 to 200 boxes (of copper); (the permits) may be used for two to three years and are subsequently thrown away.”\footnote{\textit{Huangchao wenxian tongkao}, j. 295, p. 45b.}

As for the commodities exchanged for Japanese copper, these were primarily silks and satins (chouduan 綢緞), raw silk in bulk (sijin 絲斤), sugar, and medical drugs.\footnote{Ibid. p. 46b.}

What particular steps did the Chinese government take when Japan drastically reduced the copper export quota? A change in the copper-management system was one step. The responsibility for the management of copper was again transferred to local customs stations in the eight provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Fujian, Hubei, Hunan and Guangdong.\footnote{\textit{Kangxi qiju zhu} 康熙起居注. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), vol. 3, p. 2173.} Subsequently, officials were sent from these provinces to the coast to encourage merchants to take over the provision of copper and, in this way, a bureaucratic management was reinstalled. But the quantities of copper obtained were far from enough. Actually, between Kangxi 51 (1712) and Yongzheng 1 (1723), the annual copper tax shortage amounted to 310,000 jin. Copper merchants complained that their old tax debts in copper were still unpaid even as they were being confronted with new debts.\footnote{\textit{Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi} 世宗宪皇帝硃批諭旨, j. 46, p. 36a, in \textit{Siku quanshu}, fasc. 418.} In addition, the problem of counterfeiting was omni-present. As Richard von...
Glahn has shown, “(m)uch of the stream of Japanese copper imports seem to have been diverted into the hands of private coiners.”

The decreasing quantities of copper imported by Chinese merchants from Japan at the same time aroused the suspicion of local officials, such as Li Wei 李衛 (1687?–1738)\(^{146}\), Ji Zengyun 姜曾筠 (1671–1739)\(^{147}\), Wang Tan 王坦\(^{148}\), Singgui 性桂 (?–1747)\(^{149}\), or Cai Shishan 蔡仕舢, and prompted them to react.

Very informative in our context are entries in the *Collection of memorials and imperial edicts approved by the Yongzheng Emperor* (Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi 世宗宪皇帝硃批諭旨). We read, for example, in a memorial from 1729 (yongzheng 7, 6\(^{th}\) month, 30\(^{th}\) day) that the “tiny dwarf Japan (Riben cui’er 日本蕞爾) is completely dependent on the commodities sold by merchants of our Heavenly Dynasty for its provisions”.\(^{150}\) “Since the opening of the temporary maritime prohibition under Emperor Kangxi in 1684, merchant vessels come and go and the Japanese (yi 夷) greatly profit from that.” Smuggling and the flow of contraband items out of the country were frequent. This prompted the governor-general of Zhejiang, Li Wei, to react.

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\(^{147}\) See “Chaming Wodi bantong qingxing 查查明倭地銅情形” (entry by Ji Zengyun 姜曾筠, 1671–1739), in *Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe caizhenglei huobi jinshu xiang* 宮中硃批奏折財政類貨幣金融項 (1737, 7\(^{th}\) month). Ji Zengyun was appointed governor (later governor-general) of Zhejiang and was charged with the construction of a sea wall in Zhejiang in 1736. Cf. Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period* (1991), vol. 1, p. 120.

\(^{148}\) In 1733 (yongzheng 11), he was supervisor of the Zhejiang haiguan, acting concurrently as Prefect (zhifu) of Ningbofu, cf. my list of officials in the appendix of *China’s Administration of Maritime Trade: From the Ming shibo si to the Qing haiguan* (unpublished manuscript).


\(^{150}\) *Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi*, j. 177, p. 30b.
To investigate the situation and to obtain information on treacherous merchants, such as Ke Wancang 柯萬藏, and accordingly to dole out punishment, the merchant Yu Xiaoxing 俞孝行, who was trading in the East Asian waters, and the doctor Zhu Laizhang, whom we have already mentioned above, were secretly sent to Japan to personally inquire about the situation there and bring back information. According to this document, smuggling rather than a copper shortage was a major reason for the despatch of the two “spies” but this argument may well have been put forward as a pretext. Let us first look in more detail at the concrete circumstances of the dispatchment of the spies.

In October 1728 (yongzheng 6), Li Wei interviewed Zhu Laizhang. On the pretext that he wanted Zhu to treat him medically, he summoned him to his office and explained to him the great principles of right and wrong and the advantages and disadvantages of the law. As a result, Zhu Laizhang was apparently deeply moved and started to explain about the Nagasaki Administrator, the location of Japan and the capital in Yamashiro 山城 prefecture as well as the Chinese Compound. He explained that he enjoyed a good reputation in Nagasaki because he had once cured the illness of the local administrator of Nagasaki. He was, thus, handsomely rewarded, provided with a trading licence on his departure from Japan, and permitted to go anywhere he liked, while the other Chinese merchants were under strict surveillance (夷人築墻立柵名爲土庫凡中國商人到彼俱住其中撥兵看守不許私自岀入). Then he presented a map of the harbour of

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151 Ke Wancang 柯萬藏 is said to have gone into a partnership with the villainous Fujian merchant (Fujian jianshang 福建姦商), Wei Deqing 魏德卿. They had engaged monks privately, that is, illegally, to go to the eastern seas (pingqing sengren si wang dongyang 聘請僧人私往東洋) whereupon Ke Wancang had indeed been taken into custody. A monk named Bi Feng 壁峰 (from the Huangbo Temple in Fuqing county 福清縣黃栢寺) and others, in all nine persons, had travelled by land route from Min (Fujian) to Ningbo, where they changed their names upon arrival and falsely claimed that they wanted to worship at the sacred Buddhist mountain Putuo 普陀. In Japan, the monks maintained a Fujian Temple and Chinese monks were often persuaded to go and settle there. This was called “Administration Office for Chinese Monks” (chengwei Tangseng kuijue suo 稱為唐僧揆厥所). But Ke Wancang apparently had not only smuggled monks out of the country, but also specimens of bows and arrows, helmets and mails (touchu gongjian kuijia shiyang 偷岀弓箭盔甲式樣) and recruited persons to teach archery in Japan. And thanks to the inquiries of Zhu Laizhang and Yu Xiaoxing the case of another treacherous merchant, Zhong Jintian 鍾覲天, who had already prepared commodities to be exported from Suzhou and fled to the eastern seas, had also come to light. Cf. Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 174, section 9, pp. 6b–7a.

152 Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 177, pp. 30b–31a.

153 Cf. also ZSSXDJ, p. 718.

154 Cf. “Yongzheng liu nian ba yue chu ba ri Zhejiang zongdu guan xunfu Li Wei jin zou 雍正六年八月初八日浙江總督管巡撫事李衛進奏”, in Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi 世宗憲皇帝硃批諭旨, j. 174, section 8, pp. 53a–54a.
Nagasaki, which he had drawn when practicing as a doctor there.\footnote{Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 174, section 8, pp. 53b–54a.} Laizhang’s elder brother, Zhu Peizhang, was once accused by Li Wei of smuggling a scholar named Wang Yingru 王應如 from Fujian to teach archery in Japan.\footnote{Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 174, section 9, p. 31b; Qingchao rouyuan ji, p. 76.} Perhaps for this reason, Zhu Laizhang did not mention the real activities of his brother. Instead, he fabricated a story emphasizing that he was impoverished by then and had no intention of going back to Japan.\footnote{His family, he reported, had been engaged in trade with Japan for several years and had become wealthy people. On his departure for China, he was asked through an interpreter to return with a teacher of archery, yellow peonies and three purple sandalwood trees. He returned with one peony, but when it blossomed, it turned purple (instead of yellow), as a consequence of which the administrator in Nagasaki was very angry and sent the ship home. He could prove this by customs records. As a result of this event, he had suffered great losses and returned with almost empty hands. Thus, he would not travel to Japan again.}

At the interview there was another “spy” named Yu Xiaoxing 俞孝行, who was a maritime merchant by profession, as we have seen above. Yu Xiaoxing’s brother, Yu Meiji 俞枚吉, had once protested against the Japanese trade policy to cut the copper exports ratio from 40% to 25% and successfully protected the Chinese merchants’ interests in Nagasaki.\footnote{Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 177, pp. 32b–33a. Ōba Osamu assumes that Yu Xiaoxing may have been an alias for Yu Meiji, as there are no Japanese historical documents bearing the name Yu Xiaoxing. But at least according to the Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi they were brothers.}

On the 17th day of the 10th month 1728, Li Wei granted Zhu Laizhang and Yu Xiaoxing 500 and 200 taels of silver respectively and ordered them to purchase goods and provisions popular in Japan (mai yiren su hao shiwu deng lei 買夷人所好食物等類). Subsequently, the court sent them on an espionage mission to gather more information on the trading situation, copper exports, and the treatment of Chinese merchants in Japan. Assuming the identity of physicians, they sailed to Japan, scheming to receive a trading permission (Wozhao) from the Japanese.\footnote{Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 174, section 8, p. 55b.}

On the 30th day of the 6th month of 1729, Zhu Laizhang sent a report to Singgui, who had succeeded Li Wei as the governor-general of Zhejiang. His report notes that the Japanese authorities had cut their copper trade ratio from 40% to only 25% and stepped up their surveillance of Chinese copper merchants, not allowing them to move outside of the enclosure.\footnote{Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 177, p. 32a.} It also came to light that since 1728, by preventing direct contacts and transactions between Chinese and Japanese merchants, the port authority at Nagasaki had permitted the undervaluing of Chinese goods being exchanged for Japanese copper.\footnote{See also entries in the Deshima Diaries, passim (e.g. p. 347 in 1728).} For the Chinese merchants, consequently, copper prices in Japan rose. And they applied one ship’s merchandise to the procurement of copper of another
These circumstances had greatly delayed the return of Chinese merchants from Nagasaki and led again to a radical critique of the existing system.\footnote{163}

The 1729 memorial includes further interesting information.\footnote{164} According to the previous practice, the commodities taken back to China from Japan consisted of 40\% copper and 60\% seaweed and other marine products which were called “wrapped products” (\textit{baotou 包頭}).\footnote{165} The merchants made their profits only through the purchase of copper, while all the other Japanese commodities were sold at high prices, so that other merchants made absolutely no profit from them. It continues that “at the beginning of springtime 1729, before I [i.e. Yu Xiaoxing] went to Beijing, I had heard that the Japanese ruler (\textit{toumu 頭目}), the \textit{Shōgun}, introduced ‘illegalities in taking fees’ (\textit{lougui 陋規}), requiring every ship of foreign overseas merchants to pay gold pieces (\textit{jinpián 金片}, this means Japanese gold coins). Recently, the value of every gold piece has been raised to be equivalent to six \textit{liang} of 80\% pure silver, an amount which in total would reach a value of c. 20,000–30,000 silver \textit{liang}.” What reads like a riddle in the Chinese text becomes understandable in comparison with an entry in the \textit{Deshima Diaries}. In December 1728 Opperhoofd P. Boockesteijn noted:

“On behalf of Suō, the board of interpreters paid me a visit. Gen’eimon, their spokesman, took out a document in Japanese from his paper bag. It dealt with the exchange of presents which we have to give to the governors, Sukueimon and the six \textit{stadsburgermeesters}.\footnote{166} The governors receive 4,300 taels worth of presents, Sukeimon 590 taels and the six \textit{stadsburgermeesters} receive 2,550 taels worth of presents. In the future, these presents should be paid in \textit{kobans} [小判, Japanese gold coin] valued at 68 \textit{mazen}.\footnote{167} This would mean that our expenditure on presents for the authorities of Nagasaki would be doubled. ...The Chinese had also been

\footnote{162} One ship was permitted to load a fixed quantity of copper to be exported to China. The Chinese ships’ merchandise which was imported into Japan, thus, served as a basis for calculating the procurement of copper. If the Japanese now applied the merchandise of one ship to the copper procurement of another Chinese merchant vessel, the first one obviously did not take on board any copper at all or at least much less, as only a certain quantity of commodities to be sold in Japan provided the Chinese merchants with the permission to export a fixed amount of copper.

\footnote{163} “Chaming Wodi bantong qingxing” (entry by Ji Zengyun 稽曾筠, 1671–1739), in \textit{Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe caizhenglei huobi jinshu xiang} (1737, 7\textsuperscript{th} month).

\footnote{164} \textit{Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi}, j. 177, pp. 31a–33a.

\footnote{165} In the eighteenth century, due to the decreasing quantities of silver and copper permitted to be exported from Japan, Chinese merchants had to export increasing quantities of marine products, which were apparently wrapped in a kind of rice straw called “\textit{tawara-mono} 棧物” in Japanese, in order to make their trade activities profitable.

\footnote{166} Jap. “\textit{toshiyori}”: City elders, mayors chosen by the landed proprietors in Nagasaki.

\footnote{167} A Japanese golden coin mostly valued at 6 to 8 \textit{tael}, in 1700 5.3 \textit{tael} or in 1704 5.8 \textit{tael}. 1 \textit{tael} = 10 \textit{maas} = 100 \textit{condrijn} weighing approximately 37.5 g. When the \textit{koban} was valued at 68 \textit{mazen} [\textit{maas}], this would mean that its price had been raised to 6.8 \textit{taels}.\footnote{33}
informed that the *hassaku* [八朔]\(^{168}\) had been doubled. And, should they refuse to pay, they will be forced to leave without having been able to trade. Furthermore Gen’eimon … too was of the opinion that it had all been worked out by the authorities in Nagasaki without the prior knowledge of the court.\(^{169}\) … Gen’eimon told me that the Chinese were outraged by the excessive demand.\(^{170}\)

Consequently, we learn that the illegal fees mentioned in the *Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi* refer to the additional expenditure for presents, also named “*hassaku*”.

The Chinese text continues to state that if too many overseas merchants could not meet the high expenditure, the Japanese [superiors] (*yiren*) would then go to the local interpreters to get the rest, resulting in increasing trade deficits for the interpreters who subsequently tried to get the money back from the Chinese merchants.\(^{171}\) But, when there was nothing more to get out of them, the interpreters found themselves more and more out of pocket with their continuing obligation to pay for outstanding illegal demands.

Thereupon, they discussed with the trading combines that in the future the quantity of copper permitted per ship should be reduced to 25% (*jian er fen ban tongjin* 减二分半铜斤)\(^{172}\), while the rest (75%) would belong to the so-called “wrapped products”. Formerly, 760 boxes (i.e. 40%) of copper were permitted per ship, thereafter only 475 (i.e. 25%) were permitted. The reason for this restriction, the text continues, lay in “the intention to cause foreign merchants to fail in business, as a consequence of which naturally few would go” to Japan (*qi yi yu shangke zheben ze qu zhe zishao* 其意欲使商客折本则去者自少).\(^{173}\) In reality, however, the shōgunate seemed to have been worried about the decreasing number of ships because this was a development which, in

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\(^{168}\) “*Hassaku*” or “1\(^{st}\) day of the 8\(^{th}\) month”. In commemoration of the day of entrance of Tokugawa Ieyasu into Edo in 1590, presents were given to superiors on this day, officially in order to strengthen mutual relationships.

\(^{169}\) This would substantiate the claim of Zhu Laizhang and others that the illegal fees were a product of local corruption and problems in the coordination between central and local authorities.

\(^{170}\) Entries in the *Deshima Diaries* provide evidence that it was not only the Chinese who suffered from the undervaluing of their goods but also the Dutch. *Deshima Diaries*, pp. 346–347.

\(^{171}\) According to *juan* 174 of the *Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi*, the practice of ordering the members of the Interpreters’ Office to extort and pay these fees, started in 1721 (*kangxi* 60), namely with 20,000 pieces in total. Thereafter, the sum was gradually increased until in 1726 and 1727 a great number of merchants had become bankrupt. Cf. *Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi*, j. 174, section 17, p. 45b. But what the merchants feared above all, was that they might not receive a trading permission (*Wozhao*), as a consequence of which they engaged in substantial bribery of the local Interpreters’ Office. Ibid. Because Chinese merchants were all afraid that they would not receive new trade permissions in time, this emergency was used by the interpreters to demand bribes.

\(^{172}\) The quantity of copper permitted for export by the Chinese had been reduced by the Japanese in either late 1728 or early 1729: “Yohei told me that the Chinese will only be given half the amount of copper they are used to receiving.” Cf. *Deshima Diaries*, p. 346.

\(^{173}\) *Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi*, j. 177, p. 31b (*yongzheng* 7, 6\(^{th}\) month, i.e. 1729). Also this may have been a measure to draw attention to their critical situation and not solely an attempt to ensure that fewer merchants called at Nagasaki, as a consequence of which the amount of “illegal fees” would also decrease.
the long term, would also reduce profits for Japan in general. Consequently, the shogunate gradually reduced the amount of additional fees in gold pieces. So although the local administrators and the Interpreter’s Office (yisi 譯司) were the executing organ of the Shōgun their malpractices greatly damaged mutual trade relations. Yet at the same time, there is no doubt that the interpreters’ habit of demanding bribes from the Chinese was mainly a reaction to the malpractices of the local “superiors”, such as the Nagasaki governors and the stadsburgermeesters. In fact a Chinese interpreter was among a group of citizens from Nagasaki who sent a letter of protest in which they exposed the malpractices of the Shōgun’s Stewart, Takai Sakueimon, and the six stadsburgermeesters towards the Chinese and the Dutch.174 We will have to see the dispatch of the Shōgun’s physician and herbalist as “spies” to Nagasaki in 1723 in a similar context.175 Obviously, the Shōgun saw the time as ripe to investigate the situation at Nagasaki. The statement in the Deshima Diaries that “other ‘strangers’ were also hanging around in Nagasaki” might indicate that perhaps, besides his own officials, the foreigners, the Dutch and especially the Chinese, were also the object of his spies’ investigations.

While the Japanese “continued to obstruct trade”, the report in the Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi goes on, they heard that “one year previously treacherous merchants had smuggled contraband items and persons into their country. After this had come to light and was being investigated by us, they were suddenly full of fear.” According to the report by Yu Xiaoxing, who had already returned to Hangzhou, during that year (1729) between March and April, these rumours had become known in Japan. Among the local interpreters there were some who were very worried and immediately reported to him that the actual royal family (Tangshan 唐山)176 was well able to keep an eye on the situation and had previously caught very many of those who had breached the regulations. “Furthermore (the royal family) wants to inquire and be informed about any information about us and our activities in Japan; this is why we are very cautious here (zhèbiān 這邊). You (nimen 你門)177 cannot (buke 不可) talk too much, in order to avoid saying something which might endanger your life.178 What “is here named as the Chinese royal family (Tangshan wangjia 唐山王家) is actually a designation for the official authorities of our Heavenly Dynasty.”179

Among the Japanese, it was firstly the local interpreters who got wind of the fact that the Chinese were spying on them. They suspected that smuggling, as the Chinese

174 Deshima Diaries, p. 278.
175 Deshima Diaries, pp. 278–279: “Genei’mon told me that the physician and the herbalist [of the Shōgun, A.S.] would pay a visit to Deshima for the last time. They will also pay a visit to the Apollonia. Furthermore he told me that the herbalist and the physician were in fact spies sent by Edo. Also other ‘strangers’ were hanging around in Nagasaki.”
176 This is normally a designation for a Chinese overseas community, but refers here to the Qing court.
177 Reference to Chinese merchants in general.
178 Lit. “slash open your viscera”. One character is missing in the text, but from the context – the next two characters meaning “belly, viscera” – one may guess the real meaning.
179 Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 177, pp. 31a–32a.
officially claimed, was not the true reason for China’s great interest in Japanese activities concerning trade with China. The Chinese were well able to curb smuggling, so why were they still so eager to obtain more information on the Japanese?

As a consequence of their doubts, so the document continues, “this time, when Zhu Laizhang reached Japan, the Japanese were extremely suspicious” and he had to stay in the Chinese Compound, whereas previously he could walk around very freely. “Although he was treated with unusual politeness, he was not ordered to go out and practice as a physician.” They were also afraid that he might let information leak out on Japan after his return (to China), so they granted him a shipping certificate (chuanzhao 船照) to placate him. “At that time, he had not yet returned.” Yet another merchant is cited: according to a report of the “principal merchant” (shangzong 商總), Zheng Dashan 鄭大山, when the overseas merchant, Yu Meiji, went to Japan for the second time, he personally discussed the principles of trade with the local interpreters. Accordingly, the Japanese knew quite well submission required them to return to the former copper export quota (yiren po zhi qufu yu gaifu jiu’e 夷人頗知屈服欲改復舊額) – namely 40%. But they were afraid that the Chinese (Zhongyuan 中原) might laugh at their fear and weakness. This was why they decided together with Yu that the total price of commodities on board each ship would be raised in order to compensate for the losses (zhetou 折頭). From what was formerly called gold pieces (jinsui 金水) measured in silver-liang, a reference to the above mentioned additional fees and presents to the Shōgun and the Nagasaki authorities which were revalued at a higher silver price, 2,000 to 3,000 liang were deducted per 10,000 liang. This meant that 2,000 to 3,000 liang less had to be paid to the Shōgun and Nagasaki authorities. Instead, they took copper to compensate for the amount of liang which had been deducted which meant that for commodities to a value of 2,000 liang they were now additionally allotted 120 to 130 boxes of copper pearls (tongzhu 銅珠). Although this was more or less the same amount as the original quota per ship, the Japanese made a profit of several hundred to one thousand gold coins. In other words, although the shipowners were again able to bring back to China more or less the same quantity of copper as before, they first had to purchase commodities to a value of 2,000 to 3,000 liang or more and so in fact paid more for the same quantity of copper than they had before. As

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180 Ibid. p. 30b.
181 Ibid. pp. 32a–b.
182 In 1727, Li Wei had proposed appointing so-called “principal merchants” (shangzong 商總) who should work together to regulate the Japan trade, coordinate responsibilities and to act as guarantors for merchants departing for Japan. In 1728, the Zhejiang and Jiangsu authorities appointed eight of these “principal merchants”, four being located in Zhejiang and four in Jiangsu. Circumstances meant they had to come from wealthy family backgrounds. Cf. Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 223, shang, p. 18a; see also Ng Chin-keong, Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683–1735 (Singapore: Singapore National University, 1983), pp. 178–179. Gongzhong dang Yongzheng chao zouzhe 宮中檔雍正朝奏摺. Ed. by the Guoli gugong bowuyuan 國立故宮博物院 (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1977), 30 vols., 6/12/11, vol. 12, p. 46 (Yinjishan, Jiangsu), Gongzhong dang Yongzheng chao zouzhe, 6/12/11, vol. 12, p. 58 (Li Wei, Zhejiang).
183 Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 177, pp. 32b–33a.
a consequence, although their deficits had slightly decreased as compared to a few years earlier, they were earning much less than before and many went bankrupt.

At the beginning of the qianlong reign (probably early 1737), Ji Zengyun, then superintendent of the Zhejiang haiguan, proposed to the Emperor four measures which should be carried out in the copper policy (tongzheng si shi 銅政四事). First, the procurement of (Japanese) copper in Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Zhejiang should temporarily be postponed for one year, a measure which implied the suspension of trade with Japan for one year (see below); second, the supervisors should push forward the settlement and arrangement of further revisions in the system; third, legal regulations and a strict examination of the private destruction and casting of coins should be established; fourth, it should be clearly checked whether or not the Japanese trading certificates required for the procurement of copper from Japan were being hoarded. 184 From 1728 (yongzheng 6), the Chinese government sold Japanese trading permits (Wozhao) to private merchants for only 2,000 to 3,000 taels of silver each, in order to encourage copper merchants to buy trading licenses. Those who were still in default with their copper deliveries were allowed to deduct the quantity of silver they had paid for the trade licenses from the amount of their outstanding debts in the form of copper deliveries. 185 The government’s intention was to enable the copper merchants to gradually offset their copper debts and provide the government with greater quantities of copper. Hoarding the certificates without procuring copper would be detrimental to these aims. But, despite such measures, in 1737 Ji Zengyun still complained that many copper merchants had gone bankrupt. In 1738 it was even decided that the trade licenses of the indebted merchants would be confiscated and given to new, private merchants (zhao zixie ziben de xinshang ji geiyu jiushang suoyong Wozhao chuyang cai tong 招自攜资本的新商即給與舊商所用倭照出洋採銅) who would be willing to use their own capital to provide the government with Japanese copper. 186 Ji Zengyun described the situation in a memorial to the court:

“As (the import of) copper has direct consequences for (our) copper cash, one has to thoroughly investigate the [situation] in Japan (whose people live) far away in the outer ocean. In particular, one should dispatch a person to make careful inquiries. First, last year during the 12th month, in a secret decree, the circuit intendent managing the (local) haiguan 海關, Wang Tan 王坦, had been looking for and (eventually) engaged a person to take passage on a copper ship to Japan and secretly investigate the situation. This petition follows a report by Zhu Laizhang who has been sent on the mission by Wang Tan: The place where the ships call in Japan is an island off Nagasaki. This is more than 1,000 li away from the place where the Japanese king resides. The responsibility of all matters both big and small at that place is shifted on to officials of the Shōgun. The officials in general charge of the copper management are local daimyōs (tu wangjia 土

185 Qinding Da Qing huidian zeli 欽定大清會典事例 (1899), j. 44, p. 24b.
But in the branch office [actually] responsible for the management [the persons in charge] are [the officials of] the nianxing si 年行司 (Jap. nengyō ji). Formerly, when Chinese merchant ships reached Nagasaki, Chinese merchants (neishang) could exchange their goods face to face with the Japanese merchants. There were very many possibilities to make profits, and the ships also returned quickly. Since 1728 (yongzheng 6), there are six persons in the nengyōji who manage (all trade) separately and wish to gain all profits (you fenli zhi nianxing si liu ren yu she qi li 有分理之年行司陸人欲射其利). Recently, the Japanese Shōgun also required guarantors for purchase and sale (baomai baomai 包買包賣), and Chinese merchants are no longer permitted personally to conduct trade with the Japanese. It is through the nengyōji that they are able to extort low prices for (Chinese) commodities and high prices for (Japanese) copper. Furthermore, this exhausts merchants, and the goods offered as merchandise cannot (be sold) in a skilled manner. This is the reason for their gradual deficits.

Up to the point that the luxurious desires of the nengyō ji were fully indulged, this brought about deficits similar to those of Chinese merchants. Now, that China has stopped trading for one year, is it not little wonder that the Japanese cannot conceal their deficits? Moreover, this has brought about statements such as ‘the Japanese Shōgun ascertains he will dispatch somebody to Nagasaki in the 7th or 8th month to replace (those responsible) and clear up the case by investigation.’ Furthermore, this agrees with the statement of a merchant who has already returned, Fei Zanhou 蕪贊侯, and who has been consulted by the local circuit intendent, Wang Tan. Investigating the real cause of the Japanese deficits, it has become evident that this lies in the suspension (of trade). The Shōgun in charge is also investigating this matter, in order to preserve rule and order. Only for organisation in the interior [i.e. in China] the official merchants (guanshang), who used to manage [these matters], should completely be held responsible. I now request the Emperor to urgently look for means to compensate for the shortcomings until the year jiwei (1739); for the copper (management) also the circuit intendent managing the (local) haiguan, Wang Tan, was instructed to give his full attention to settling and arranging the time limits previously fixed by the office in charge of the management (liaoli wu 料理務) and to act cautiously in any case so that there would be no more delays in smelting (copper)... Although Japanese territory belongs to the outer northern barbarians (wodi sui shu waiyi 倭地雖屬外夷), one should explore the situation there; indeed very respectfully and submissively this secret memorial is put together and I humbly pray that the Emperor with his profound wisdom may consider this.”

187 Mentioning these “six persons of the nengyō ji” most probably refers to the so-called “toshiyori” or “stadsburgermeesters”, the city elders and mayors chosen by the landed proprietors in Nagasaki. At least they were the driving force behind the “evil practices” described here. 1728, we should recall, was also the year when the hassaku presents were increased.

188 Cf. “Chaming Wodi bantong qingxing” (entry by Ji Zengyun), in Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe cai-zhenglei huobi jinshu xiang (1737, 7th month).
Zhu Laizhang had been sent to Japan in late 1728 by Li Wei. Following the memorial
by Ji Zengyun in the Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe caizhenglei huobi jinshu xiang (1737, 7th
month) translated here in extenso, Zhu Laizhang was obviously sent to Japan for a
second time, namely by the haiguan supervisor, Wang Tan, around the turn of the year
from 1736 to 1737, shortly before Ji Zengyun took office as haiguan supervisor in
1737. And this time his report seems to have looked somewhat more closely behind
the scenes in Japan. For example, the nengyō ji as the official administration office in
Nagasaki is mentioned as well as some general observations on Japan’s administration.
Interestingly too, this report also refers to the concerns of the Shōgun.

On the basis of Zhu Laizhang’s original report, Ji Zengyun explains in his document to
the court that “officials in general charge of the copper management are local daimyōs”,
while those in “the branch office responsible for the management” “are the mayors of
the town and the officials who administer the Chinese settlement”, that is the nengyō ji.
Since they were “more than 1,000 li away from the place where the Japanese king
resides”, one could conclude that they were actually at liberty to act as they wish, for
administrative control would simply be too lax.

This would imply that both Zhu Laizhang and Ji Zengyun rather considered
shortcomings in the administration of maritime trade at Nagasaki as one reason for the
problem. But even worse, since 1728, “there are six persons of the nengyō ji who
manage (all trade) separately and wish to gain all profits”. They monopolized the
nengyō ji, were “able to extort low prices for (Chinese) commodities and high prices for
(Japanese) copper”, as a consequence of which eventually everybody suffered losses –
even the Japanese themselves. This statement clearly shows that they saw incompetency
in administration, corruption, and illegal enrichment as major causes of the decreasing
copper imports and the deficits of Chinese merchants.

The big problem for Japan, on the other hand, “the real cause for (their) deficits”, as the
report continues, basically lay in the suspension of trade by the Chinese government.
Also following another entry in the Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, the Chinese
exchanged medical products for the copper they needed, and the regions between Tōkyō
and Nagasaki were completely dependent on the sale of copper for their livelihood. And
if this trade of more than 100,000 merchants was interrupted, they would have nothing
to live on. The implication was that Japan was dependent on the sale of copper to the
Chinese.

If the Japanese now have a big problem, because the Chinese government suspended
trade for one year, this means that the first of Ji Zengyun’s measures concerning copper

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189 Cf. my list of haiguan officials (unpublished manuscript).
190 This was exactly the time when the central government decided to restructure its copper
management system and partly liberalized and privatized it. Early in 1736 a radical critique of the
prevailing system of acquiring copper from Japan had strongly proposed that the government should
strengthen private commerce without strict state involvement to guarantee the importation of copper
in sufficient quantities from Japan. The Vice-president of the Ministry of Revenue, Li Fu 李紱
(1675–1750), argued in this direction.
191 Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j, 174, section 17, pp. 46a–b.
policy (see above)\textsuperscript{192} had actually been realized and simultaneously, in 1738, led to a one-year interruption of the copper trade with Japan.\textsuperscript{193} In this context, memorials in the Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe caizhenglei huobi jinshu xiang repeatedly speak of the “\textit{wuwu 戊午} temporary interruption in the management of Japanese copper” (\textit{wuwu nian 为民年停辦洋銅}), “\textit{wuwu}” referring to the year 1738 – in order to clear and limit the annually recorded debts accumulated by Chinese merchants.\textsuperscript{194}

What further conclusions did Ji Zengyun draw from his observations? In his eyes, it was in the self interest of the Japanese ruler to resume the former and better terms of trade for the Chinese, as the country was dependent on the China trade. Although he had put his finger on a true aspect of the mutual trade relations, it was exactly this heavy dependency on Chinese imports that the Japanese were at least attempting to change. Obviously, Ji Zengyun, like others before him, was quite certain that Japan simply had no alternative but to resume the old trade regulations. In his eyes, the real problem lay in the fact that the highest authority of Japan who would immediately see the dependency of his country on the China trade, the Japanese king, was too weak. Similar to the statement mentioned above that the Japanese were “afraid that the Chinese might laugh at their fear and weakness”, other entries in the \textit{Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi} also speak of the weak Japanese king who has no authority (\textit{Riben guowang roumuo wu neng quan 日本國王柔懦無能權}) and thus transfers all his business to the \textit{shōguns} who then manage the affairs with the Chinese merchants at Nagasaki and established an Interpreters’ Office (\textit{yisi 譯司}) using the interpreters as mediators for the trade with China.\textsuperscript{195}

At the end of his memorial, Ji Zengyun returns to China’s major problem in her contemporary relations with Japan – the insufficient quantities of copper imported from Japan. We should perhaps recall that when Li Wei arranged the first dispatchment of “spies” to Japan, problems with smuggling and treacherous merchants were also raised as arguments for the necessity of this extraordinary measure.\textsuperscript{196} Ji Zengyun’s conclusion proceeded thus: “(a)lthough Japanese territor y belongs to the outer northern barbarians, one should explore the situation there”. This suggests that he was at least suspicious and cautiously tried to convince the emperor to become more active and to investigate more

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Huangchao wenxian tongkao}, j. 295, pp. 45b–46a.
\textsuperscript{193} See also Yamawaki Teijirō, \textit{Nagasaki no Tōjin bōeki} (1964), p. 318.
\textsuperscript{194} See for example a memorial by Yinjishan 尹繼善 (1696–1771) dated 1737, 5\textsuperscript{th} month, 27\textsuperscript{th} day; or a memorial signed by more than forty officials dated 1737, 7\textsuperscript{th} month (day not decipherable).
\textsuperscript{195} According to the \textit{Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi}, j. 174, section 8, p. 43b, established in 1705 (\textit{kangxi} 54). Perhaps this date refers to the following story recorded in the \textit{Deshima Diaries}, pp. 73–74, January 1706: “Kichidayū, who is always the first to tell us the latest news, told me that two \textit{dwarsskijkers} [inspectors, Jap. \textit{metsuke 目付}] of the Chinese island had been dismissed and had been replaced by two junior interpreters. The \textit{dwarsskijkers} were not overly pleased with this decision, since now they are losing 2,000 \textit{taels} a year. …Two new junior interpreters have been appointed to the Chinese island.” Actually, the institution of the interpreters goes back to the early 30s of the seventeenth century and began with a certain Feng Liu 馮六, Mr Feng the Sixth, in \textit{keichō} 9 (1604). Cf. Yamawaki Teijirō, \textit{Nagasaki no Tōjin bōeki} (1964), p. 294.
\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi}, j. 177, p. 30b, and j. 174, section 9, pp. 6b–7a.
thoroughly as to whether there were perhaps still other causes for Japan’s export restrictions, although Japan was considered an “outer barbarian”.

Consequently, the reports by Zhu Laizhang enabled local officials in China to obtain a relatively good insight into Japan’s internal political situation. But there is hardly any evidence that the Chinese may have seen anything other than arbitrariness and incompetence in the central and local administrations as causes for the reduction of copper export quotas, that they may perhaps have understood the real reason for the repeated change in the Japanese government’s policy, that they may have inquired more thoroughly into Japan’s real problems with the supply of copper in Nagasaki, or that they raised doubts about the prevailing attitude that because Japan was dependent on Chinese commodities, she should therefore, in her own interest resume the former conditions of trade. As we have seen above, that was exactly one of the aims of the Japanese rulers to reduce this kind of dependency.

What about the emperors, Yongzheng and Qianlong? Although Yongzheng, unlike Kangxi, never personally carried out military actions, he was perpetually confronted with questions of border disputes or border defence and also had spies infiltrating the circles of high officials within China, as he was afraid of conspiracy. In addition, as we have seen above, he was very critical of Kangxi’s extremely passive Japan policy. In this context, Yongzheng may have been an almost ideal addressee for Ji Zengyun’s concerns, although the sources rather suggest that Yongzheng, too, did not intend to pursue any aggressive policy towards Japan but rather a stricter defence of the maritime border peripheries. Expressed in his own words, the primacy of foreign policy lay in eliminating exterior harm – “the ancient principle of first pacifying the interior before one can repulse the exterior” (an nei rang wai, yao bu chu qian yu 安内攘外要不出前 諭) – and should always be maintained. But in 1737, when Ji Zengyun launched his memorial, the Qianlong Emperor had already ascended the throne. And the latter very obviously intended to strengthen China’s autarky and make the country again independent of Japanese copper imports. At least he no longer wanted to finance indebted merchants but transferred the responsibility to provide the government with Japanese copper to private merchants who were expected to use their own capital. The reasons why the copper merchants had piled up such large debts were perhaps not only to be found in their trading activities at Nagasaki which were not as profitable as desired, but may be traced to irregularities in the Chinese copper managing system as well.

As a consequence of the attitudes described above, hardly any practical measures from the Chinese side followed concerning a change in her relations with Japan. Instead, in the early qianlong reign the domestic copper management system once again underwent

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197 Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 174, section 8, p. 28b. The sentence may also be interpreted in the sense of “maintaining peace within China and repulsing the outer barbarians”, the idea behind this principle being that only if one has pacified and strengthened China’s policy, economy and society, is one strong enough and able to repel danger from abroad.

198 Qingchao wenxian tongkao, j. 17, p. 5010.

199 This question will be investigated in more detail by participants of the research project “Monetary, markets, and finance in China and East Asia, 1600–1900”, supervised by Hans Ulrich Vogel of the Sinological Department, Tübingen University, Germany, especially by Thomas Hirzel.
a basic reformation. Domestic mining, especially in Yunnan, was promoted and the responsibility to procure copper was, one might say, “shoved onto” merchants. A more serious interest in Japan’s internal politics and the reasons why they had changed the system no longer existed by then.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that Sino-Japanese relations experienced great qualitative changes during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. By the reign period of the Yongzheng Emperor one can even partly speak of a reversal of the former master-vassal relationship. Whereas during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Japan was the vassal who had to obey strict regulations imposed by China and who accepted formal subordination under the Chinese tribute system, the new Tokugawa rulers, starting from the time of Ieyasu, were no longer willing to reestablish the former vassal-tribute relations with China, although officially the East Asian political order, with China at the centre, was reinforced. Japan intended to create her own trade regulations showing her independence and authority vis-à-vis China. By the early seventeenth century the Chinese in Japan were increasingly put under political control and found themselves very much restricted in their mobility, just as the Japanese had formerly been in China. The reasons for that were both political-economic and ideological: due to Japan’s intention to take a leading role in East Asian waters so as to display their equality (or perhaps even superiority) in relation to China, to gain a better control over the China trade and the smuggling activities of Chinese merchants at Nagasaki, and perhaps also in order to consolidate the price of copper. The search for a tighter control of the China trade has finally also to be seen in relation to Japan’s attempt to substitute imports by promoting its domestic production and, thus, to reduce the export of previously high quantities of precious metals.

200 After 1737, all responsibility was handed to a limited number of private merchants, the so-called “quota merchants” (eshang 额商), and (from 1744) additionally to a single magnate contractor. The quota merchants were a group of twelve merchants from the lower Yangzi basin. They were selected by the customs superintendent and were granted Japanese trade permissions by the Treasury in order to import the assigned amount of copper. The magnate contractors, conversely, acted as official government merchants and were directly affiliated with the Imperial Household Department (neiwufu). The Fan 范 lineage is one example of that: Fan merchants dominating the copper trade until c. 1783.

201 The total amount of copper to be procured was decreased from 4,430,000 to 4,000,000 jin, half of which should be purchased from Yunnan and half from Japan. Thus, from 1738, both Yunnan and Japanese copper were used and merchants permitted to sell quantities beyond this figure freely on the market. After 1739, also Jiangsu and Zhejiang should purchase their annual copper quota from Yunnan, which actually meant that the whole amount of 4,000,000 jin for the metropolitan mints actually came from Yunnan. Copper continued to be imported from Japan to Jiangsu and Zhejiang, but it was now used for local mints instead.

As far as ideology is concerned, the picture of China among the élite circles in Japan changed from a positive model to an uncivilized, “barbarian” country. This had to do both with Japan’s increasing self-confidence and with the political take-over of China by the Manchus, who were apparently regarded as rather uncivilized. On the other hand, our examples have shown that Chinese knowledge and specialists in the fields of medicine, horsemanship and archery as well as law and institutions were still highly valued. Otherwise, the mainly officially sponsored importation of relevant texts and specialists would hardly be understandable. So Japan’s interest in trade with China continued despite the restrictions: not only in commodities – silks, medical drugs and books – but also in knowledge and specialists in various fields (generally perhaps best summarized under the term “practical learning”) that were as sought after by the Japanese as before. Japan’s interest in China, we can conclude, was consequently of an economic, scientific, cultural and political nature. But increasing emphasis was placed on the strengthening of one’s own central power and domestic economy and the control of foreign trade. To guarantee that all the desired Chinese products could be paid for, the shogunate obviously tried to improve the supply of Nagasaki with export copper rather than simply restricting its export, 203 a measure which was, however, associated with various problems. In spite of all the attempts to provide Chinese merchants with more copper, export quantities decreased and the Chinese complained about insufficient copper quantities and setbacks in their Nagasaki trade.

China’s interest in Japan, conversely, was primarily of an economic nature: the importation of copper, which was urgently needed above all for the casting of bronze coins. The rising demand for bronze cash was due to the requirement of expanding local markets which required a solid means of circulation for the “small commodity circulation”, for which silver was inadequate. Consequently, the lack of sufficient copper in China, the export restrictions imposed by Japan (which was China’s major source of copper for several decades) and eventually Japan’s inability to provide Chinese merchants with enough export copper, prompted the Chinese government to react. High local officials, such as Li Wei, Ji Zengyun, or Wang Tan, saw the necessity to investigate more thoroughly the real situation in Japan and the causes of the problems for Chinese copper merchants. But their measures never had any far-reaching consequences as far as China’s diplomacy towards Japan is concerned.

Perhaps except for the Yongzheng Emperor, neither Kangxi nor Qianlong or their officials really freed themselves from the traditional prejudice that Japan was China’s weaker neighbour and dependent on China and her commodities. As a consequence of this, they never really recognized the reasons and principles of Japan’s new trading policy, which was to strengthen Japan and its economy, for example through the attempt to substitute imports by the promotion of domestic production, and, thus, to become more independent of the China trade. In this respect, China’s interest in Japan was of a limited, relative nature and despite recognition of the necessity to investigate more thoroughly what was actually happening in Japan, even the most active officials seemed to have been caught up in a feeling of national superiority. This attitude, which could be considered a form of arrogance, at least partly stems from the assumption that it was Japan’s duty and responsibility to care about good relations with China and that the Japanese ruling élite subscribed to this view too. This even appears in the report by Yu

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Meiji – “the Japanese know quite well submission requires them to return to the former copper export quota permitted”\(^{\text{204}}\) – as we have seen above.

The analysis of the sources introduced above basically all suggest that both emperors and officials regarded administrative insufficiency, political weakness and personal corruption as the reasons for Japan’s stricter monopolization of foreign trade with China. Their conclusion from these assumptions was that if the “greedy” officials who wanted “to gain all profits” were removed and direct and free trade between Chinese and Japanese merchants re-established, the terms of trade could once again take a positive direction for the Chinese.

In the same sense that Japan’s restrictions of the China trade were of a conditional, limited nature, as I have argued above, China’s interest in Japan remained conditional and limited.\(^{\text{205}}\) And at the same time, the conviction early in the seventeenth century already expressed by Xu Guangqi (1562–1633) that “Japan relies on our country for the supply of merchandise. It is impossible to stop it”\(^{\text{206}}\) – was quite obviously still prevailing during the Kangxi, Yongzheng and early Qianlong reigns. The Chinese ruling élite seemed convinced that Japan would, out of her own interest and dependency on the China trade eventually abolish all measures damaging that trade, as a consequence of which they never considered taking active counter measures. In addition, they seemed convinced that, in contrast to Korea and the Ryûkyû which had been invaded by Japan in 1592 and 1609 respectively, Japan would never dare to attack China.\(^{\text{207}}\) China’s emperors and officials still regarded their country as the undisputed “master” in East Asian waters, and Japan as China’s vassal.

China’s official attitude to Japan during the Kangxi, Yongzheng and early Qianlong reigns was characterized by the wish, at first, to get more silver, and later, as much copper as possible from Japan. Although the need for these metals eventually prompted the Chinese government to react and even to send “spies” to Japan, their analysis did not contribute to a real understanding of Japan’s new trading policy and nationalist political and diplomatic aims serving Japan’s purpose. No doubt, the Kangxi Emperor in

\(^{204}\) Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi, j. 177, pp. 32b–33a.

\(^{205}\) Some scholars even go a step further, but this mainly refers to China’s relations with the West and not her neighbouring countries. Ng Chin-keong has recently noted that “intelligence-gathering and knowledge-generating had not been part of Qing China’s political culture in the face of a rapidly changing maritime world. It is far-fetched to say that eighteenth-century Qing China was not curious about the outside world, or rejected outright things foreign. However, what attracted the emperor, officials and rich families were ‘curious’ rather than steam machines. Consequently, there was no sense of urgency and no desire to go beyond existing rudimentary ideas about the maritime world until the crisis of the Opium War shook the country, and changed the nature of curiosity among the Chinese.” Ng Chin-keong, “Information and Knowledge: Qing China’s Perceptions of the Maritime World in the Eighteenth Century”, in Angela Schottenhammer (ed.), The East Asian Maritime World (2007), pp. 87–98, here p. 97.


\(^{207}\) On this question cf. Watanabe Miki, especially her explanation of Tokugawa Ieyasu’s threat to attack China in the near future and the lack of any severe reaction from the Chinese court. In that case, we are probably safe to conclude, as Watanabe Miki has shown, that the Ming court most probably was never really informed about Ieyasu’s plans.
particular was one of the most open and curious rulers and showed a serious interest also in aspects of Western learning and knowledge. But his interest in the West also did not go much beyond the scientific one. Neither he nor his officials were really interested in the political economy of the states that brought all the new knowledge to China and the real reasons why the latter suddenly stood ante portas. Nor were they obviously interested in changes in the political economy of a neighbouring country like Japan that they at least officially still considered as a kind of tribute country subjected to China – the “tiny dwarf”. As we have seen above, the Yongzheng Emperor did have his suspicions concerning Japan’s maritime policy. But even his critical view of Kangxi’s passive Japan policy did not bring about any significant change in that policy.

On the other hand, we should be cautious in viewing China’s reaction to Japan’s new policy simply as the product of an arrogant sense of superiority, characterized by disinterest in or even ignorance of what was going on in Japan. The analysis of the “spies” was not completely without consequences. With the accession of the Qianlong Emperor to the throne, as we have seen, increasing importance was paid to the promotion of domestic copper mines, especially in Yunnan, which aimed at making China more independent of Japanese copper and strengthening the country’s economic autarky in general. The causes of Japan’s new trading policy as well as other measures which had negatively influenced Sino-Japanese copper trade were consequently only of secondary importance. The politico-economic emphasis rather lay on the development of China’s own resources. Perhaps this was the consequence of the conclusions that the Qianlong Emperor drew from reports such as that by Zhu Laizhang and forwarded to him by Ji Zengyun: China must again become more independent of Japanese copper and concentrate on its own resources.

This may explain why, despite a changing political economy in a neighbouring country, “no sense of urgency” emerged to prompt China towards gaining a thorough understanding of the real situation there. Her consciousness of real and alleged superiority in terms of economy, politics and culture (at least up to the time period under discussion here) constituted the basis for the relative disinterest in Japan. That China’s rulers could afford such a standpoint towards Japan has to be traced back to her real economic and political superiority in East Asia and the fact that her political economy remained orientated towards autarky and was in the end not dependent on foreign resources. Both China and Japan wanted mutual trade and certain commodities, but at least from the Chinese perspective, this had no far-reaching consequences for her diplomacy regarding Japan – not even against the background of a lack in money metals.209

209 We should take this into consideration especially in comparison to the actions of the British some decades later.
List of books taken to Japan by Zhu Laizhang

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<tr>
<th>Book Title</th>
<th>Translation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td><strong>Yuan Heng liaoma ji 元亨療馬集</strong> (Collection by Yuan and Heng on the medical treatment of horses) by Yuben Yuan 喻本元 and Yuben Heng 喻本亨 (16th century)</td>
<td>Zheben yima shu 折本醫馬書(^{210}) (Abridged version of the Book on medical care for horses)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Li Du quanji 李杜全集 (Collected works of Li Bai [701–762] and Du Fu [712–770])</td>
<td>Danxi xinsong 丹溪心松 (Zhu Danxi’s mastery of heart and longevity)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yizong bidu 醫宗必讀 (Essential readings from the medical tradition of Li Zhongzi 李中梓 [1588–1655])</td>
<td>Shiwen leiju 事文類聚 (Collection of matters and literature categorized into classes) by Zhu Mu 祝穆 [?-after 1246](^{211})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guang Qunfang pu 廣群芳譜 (Comprehensive botanical treatise of the Qing period) by Wang Hao 汪灝 (jinshi 1685), Zhang Yishao 張逸少 et al. (submitted 1708)(^{212})</td>
<td>Zhengzi tong 正字通 (Correct character dictionary) by Zhang Zilie 張自烈 (1627)(^{213})</td>
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\(^{210}\) This may be a wrong title for the Korean Mayi shu 馬醫書 by Xu Juzheng 徐居正 (1420–1488) (see www.atcvm.cn/lxwm/dwjl_001.html; 29.12.2007); I could otherwise not identify this title.

\(^{211}\) The original by Zhu Mu was later extended by Fu Dayong 富大用 (Yuan) who compiled the “xinji 新集” and the “waiji 外集” chapters and by Zhu Yuan 祝淵 (Yuan) who wrote the “yiji 遺集” chapter.


\(^{213}\) It was originally published as a supplement to the 1615 edition of the Zihui 字彙 (Character dictionary) edited by Mei Yingzuo 梅膺祚 and mentioned below in the list.
| Jing Yue quanji 景岳全集  
(Complete works of Zhang Jiebin 張介賓 [1563–1640]) | Wujing 五經  
(Five classics) [i.e. Yijing 易經, Shiijing 詩經, Shujing 書經 resp. 尚書, Liji 禮記, and the Chunqiu 春秋] |
|---|---|
| Yuan Liaofan gangjian bu 袁了凡綱鑒補  
(Supplement of the chronological outline of history) by Yuan Liaofan [1533–1606] | Zihui 字彙  
(Character dictionary) edited by Mei Yingzuo 梅膺祚 [fl. late Ming]214 (1615) |
| Xiyou ji 西游記  
(Journey to the West) by Wu Cheng’en 吳承恩 [c. 1500–c. 1582] | Leilin xinyong 類林新咏  
(Encyclopeadic collection of new songs) by Yao Zhiyin 姚之駰 [jinshi 1721] |
| Zhongyi Shuihu zhuan 忠義水滸傳  
(Loyalty and righteousness in the marshes of mount Liang) edited by Shi Nai’an 施耐庵 and Luo Guanzhong 羅貫中 (13th century) | [Qinding] Liubu zeli quanshu 六部則例全書  
([Imperially commissioned] Complete book on the regulations of the Six Boards) (1676) |
| Yitong zhengmai 醫統正脈  
(Compendium of traditional pulse diagnosis) compiled by Wang Kentang 王肯堂 [1549–1613] | [Qinding] Da Qing huidian 欽定大清會典  
([Imperially commissioned] Collected statutes of the Great Qing Dynasty) by Yun Cuo 允挫 et al. |
| Da Ming huidian 大明會典  
(Collected statutes of the Great Ming Dynasty) by Shen Shixing 申時行 [1535–1614] et al. (1587) | Bogu tu 博古圖  
(Drawings and lists of all antiques known during the Xuanhe reign period [1119–1125]) edited by Wang Fu 王黼 [1079–1126] et al. (1123) |
| Wannian libei kao 萬年曆備考  
(Appendix to the permanent calendar) by Zhu Zaiyu 朱載堉 [1536–1611] | Jinyun jianlue 今韻箋略  
(Outline of comments and documents on modern rhymes) by Wang Liming 汪立名, 5 juan (kangxi period) |

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214 This was the first dictionary which introduced the modern 214 radical system.
| **Liwen shiyun 笠翁詩韻**  
*Dictionary of rhymes* by Li Yu 李漁  
[1610–1680] (1673) | **Xiaolin guangji 笑林廣記**  
*Extensive notes from the groves of laughter* edited by Yiuixi zhuren 邊的主人  
[Master of Playfulness, a pen name] |
|---|---|
| **Wang Changling ji 王昌齡集**  
*Collected works of Wang Changling* [?–c. 756] | **Luo Binwang wenji 駱賓王文集**  
*Collected works of Luo Bingwang* [640–684] |
| **Chen Jiazhou ji 岑嘉州集**  
*Collected works from Jiazhou* by Chen Can 岑參 [c. 715–770] | **Huajian ji 花間集**  
*Ci poetry from among the flowers* by Zhao Chongzuo 趙崇祚 [mid-tenth cent.] |
| **Shijing 詩經**  
*The book of songs* [China’s oldest anthology of poetry] | **Bencao gangmu 本草綱目**  
*Outline of Chinese materia medica* by Li Shizhen 李時珍 [1518–1593] |
| **Jiyan liangfang 集驗良方**  
*Collection of effective prescriptions* edited by Nian Xiyao 年希堯 [c. 1678–1738] (1724) | **Yifang jianjing 醫方捷徑**  
*An easy introduction into medical prescriptions* edited by Wang Zongxian 王宗顯 (1619) |
| **Wubei zhi 武備志**  
*Treatise on armament technolog* by Mao Yuanyi 茅元儀 [1594–1649] (1621) | **Zhenglei bancao 證類本草**  
*Classified pharmacopoeia* by Tang Shenwei 唐慎微 [fl c. 1082–after 1108] (c. 1082) |
| **Shiwusheng lun xieben 十五省論冩本**  
*Manuscript edition of the Discussion of [the complete gazetteer of the] fifteen provinces* | **Sishu tizhu 四書體註**  
*Annotated edition of the Four Books* attributed to Deng Lin 鄧林 and Yuan Zideng 苑紫登 |
| **Yishu xieben 醫書冩本**  
*Manuscript edition of the Book on medicine* | **Sishu zhenben 四書真本**  
*Authentic edition of the Four Books, i.e. Lunyu 論語, Daxue 大學, Zhongyong 中庸, and Mengzi 孟子* |

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215 This may refer to a manuscript edition of the *Yishu daquan 醫書大全* (*Great encyclopaedia on medicine*), which goes back to the Ming edition edited and published by Xiong Zongli 熊宗立 (1409–1482) in the Zhongdetang 種德堂 printing house of the Xiong family in 1467. A printed version had already reached Japan during Ming times and had been used by Asa’inō Sōzui.
| Qi caizi shu 七才子書  
(Seventh book on the pillars of wisdom) =  
Pipa ji 琵琶記 (Record on the Pipa) by Gao Ming 高明  
[jinshi] 1345, ?–1359 | Yaoxing jie 藥性解  
(Explanation of the nature of medical drugs) \(^{217}\) |
| --- | --- |
| Yaoxing fu 藥性賦  
(Nature and properties of medical drugs in verse style) by anonymous \(^{218}\) | Zengbu shifa rumen 增補[訂]詩法入門  
(Introduction into the rules of poetry, revised and enlarged edition) attributed to You Yi 游藝 (Qing) |
| Zengbu bencao beiyao 增補本草備要  
(Revised and enlarged edition of the preparation of essentials for materia medica) by Wang Ang 汪昂  
[1615–after 1694] | Cixue quanshu 詞學全書  
(Complete collection of studies on Ci-poetry) by Cha Peiji 查培继 (1679) |
| Xu Tong’an xiansheng gao 許同安先生稿  
(Draft of Xu Tong’an’s, i.e. Xu Xia 許獬 [Ming], works) | Yinhai jingzheng 銀海精徵  
(Essential Subtleties on the Silver Sea: a Classic on Ophthalmology) by Sun Simiao 孫思邈 [581–682?] |
| Sishu [jingyi huowen da quanji shuo] he can 四書[精義或問大全集說]合參  
(A complete edition of the Four Books including all explanations on the proper meaning and the questions) | Zengbu shiwu ding sishu beizhi 增補十五  
訂四書備旨  
(15\(^{th}\) revised and enlarged edition of the Four Books with additional suggestions) |
| Da Qing yongzheng san nian shixian li  
大清雍正三年時憲曆  
(1725 edition of the Shixian calendar of the Great Qing) \(^{219}\) | Xinke juezhi quanlan 新刻爵秩全覽  
(Newly edited Complete official directory of the Empire) (1731) |

\(^{216}\) It is not entirely clear which edition exactly is referred to here.

\(^{217}\) Perhaps this refers to the Leigong paozhi yaoxing jie 雷公炮制藥性解, originally by Li Gao 李杲 (1180–1251), later edited by Li Zhongzi 李中梓 (1588–1655).

\(^{218}\) This is a prescription collection.

\(^{219}\) The German Jesuit astronomer Adam Schall von Bell (Chin. Tang Ruowang 湯若望, 1591–1666), who had translated Western books on astronomy and the calendar, was appointed head of the astronomical bureau by the Manchu Regent Dorgon. In August 1644, Dorgon commanded him to prepare a calendar based on Western mathematical calculations, which later became known as the...
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<tr>
<td>Huishu xiangzhu 彙書詳諸</td>
<td>Classified book collection carefully commented edited by Zou Daoyuan 鄒道元 [Ming] (1595)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangyou lu 尚友錄</td>
<td>Biographical dictionary [lit. to go and make friends] edited by Liao Yongxian 廖用賢 [Ming]</td>
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<td>Zhangshi yitong 張氏醫通</td>
<td>Comprehensive knowledge on medicine by Mr Zhang [Ming] (1617–1700)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑒</td>
<td>Comprehensive mirror for aid in government edited by Sima Guang [1019-1086]</td>
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<td>Kangxi cidian 康熙字典</td>
<td>Dictionary of the Kangxi period (1716)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sancai tuhui 三才圖會</td>
<td>Illustrated encyclopaedia of the three realms of 1609, edited by 王圻 &amp; 王思意 (1529–1612)</td>
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<td>Banruo xinjing 般若心經</td>
<td>Hrday pāramitā śūtra, heart śūtra</td>
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<td>Sūtra of Guanyin Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva</td>
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<td>Fahua jing 法華經</td>
<td>The Lotus Sutra</td>
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<td>Fujian tongzhi 福建通志</td>
<td>Local gazetteer of Fujian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shanxi tongzhi 山西通志</td>
<td>Local gazetteer of Shanxi</td>
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</table>

**Shixian calendar 時憲曆**, which may be translated as “calendar regulating time” or “time regulation calendar”.

The title mentioned here, “Sanfang tuhui 三方圖會”, must be a mistake for Sancai tuhui, which was also exported to Japan. The Sancai tuhui was also one of the works that stimulated similar Japanese works, such as the *Wakan Sansai zue 和漢三才圖會* (a Japanese encyclopaedia with illustrations completed in 1712) and *Morokoshi kinmō zui 唐土訓蒙圖彙* (a Japanese encyclopaedia widely covering affairs in China, published in 1719) – the forerunners of the full-colour prints (*nishiki-e* 臘繪). The *nishiki-e* drawings of outlandish figures, as Kawamoto Tsutomu states, reflect the social climate of those days that put pressure on Japan to open the country to foreign trade and diplomatic relations. Cf. Kawamoto Tsutomu, “Nishiki-e depicting *Iki-ningyo*”, *National Diet Library/Kokuritsu kokkai toshokan* 155 (2007), according to the online journal copy (http://www.ndl.go.jp/en/publication/ndl_newsletter/155/557.html, 01.01. 2008). The *Morokoshi kinmō zui 唐土訓蒙圖彙* by Hirazumi Sen’an 平住専庵 and Tachibana Morikuni 橘守國 (1679–1784) is available as a digital archive source, cf. http://record.museum.kyushu-u.ac.jp/karakinmou/top.html.
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<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>浙江通志 (Local gazetteer of Zhejiang)</td>
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